47 ideas
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: A world w' is accessible to a consistent world w if and only if w' is possible in w. Being 'inaccessible to' or 'possible relative to' a consistent world is simply being possible according to that world, nothing more and nothing less. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: More illuminating than just saying that w can 'see' w'. Accessibility is internal to worIds. It gives some connection to why we spend time examining modal logic. There is no more important metaphysical notion than what is possible according to actuality. |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Insofar as modal logic is concerned exclusively with the logic of metaphysical modality, ..T may well be the one and only (strongest) correct system of (first-order) propositional logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This contrasts sharply with the orthodox view, that S5 (or at the very least S4) is the correct system for metaphysics. |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Even the conventionally accepted system B, which is weaker than S5 and independent of S4, has not been adequately justified as a fallacy-free system of reasoning about what might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The characteristic of B has the form φ⊃□◊φ. ...Even if these axioms are necessarily true, it seems logically possible for p to be true while the proposition that p is necessarily possible is at the same time false. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Friends of B modal logic commit themselves to the loaded claim that it is logically true that the property of possibly being realized (or being a way things might have been) is an essential property of the world. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
| A reaction: I think this 'loaded' formulation captures quite nicely the dispositional view I favour, that the possibilities of the actual world are built into the actual world, and define its nature just as much as the 'categorial' facts do. |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: We can say of a wooden table that it would have been possible for it to have originated from some different matter, even though it is not actually possible. So what is necessary fails to be necessarily necessary, and S4 modal logic is fallacious. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: When we ignore accessibility altogether, we have finally zeroed in on S5 modal logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Believers in S5 as a correct system of propositional reasoning about what might have been must claim that it is an essential property of any way things might have been that things might have been that way. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
| A reaction: Salmon is working in a view where you are probably safe to substitute 'necessary' for 'essential' without loss of meaning. |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Counterpart-theoretic modal semantics allows for the retention of S5 modal propositional logic, at a considerable cost. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V n18) | |
| A reaction: See the other ideas in this paper by Salmon for his general attack on S5 as the appropriate system for metaphysical necessity. He favours the very modest System T. |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical modal logic concerns metaphysical (or alethic) necessity and metaphysical (alethic) possibility, or necessity and possibility tout court - as opposed to such other types of modality as physical necessity, epistemic necessity etc. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro n2) |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: By admitting possible worlds of unlimited variation and recombination, I simply abandon true metaphysical essentialism. By my lights, any property is attached to anything in some possible world or other. I am a closet radical anti-essentialist. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: Salmon includes impossible worlds within his scheme of understanding. It strikes me that this is metaphysical system which tells us nothing about how things are: it is sort of 'logical idealist'. Later he talks of 'we essentialists'. |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Just as nomological possibility is a special kind of metaphysical possibility, so metaphysical possibility is a special kind of logical possibility. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view of how the three types of necessity are nested. He gives a possible counterexample in footnote 7. |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The S5 theorist's miscontrual of English (in the meaning of 'possibly possible') makes nested modality unseen, but it does not make nested modality vanish. Inaccessible worlds are still worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: It is held that it is the hallmark of metaphysical necessity is that it is completely unrestricted, the limiting case of restricted necessity, with no restrictions whatever. A proposition is necessary only if it is true in absolutely every world whatever. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard picture which leads to the claim that S5 modal logic is appropriate for metaphysical necessity, because there are no restrictions on accessibility. Salmon raises objections to this conventional view. |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Though there is a way things logically could be according to which I am a credit card account, there is no way things metaphysically might be according to which I am a credit card account. This illustrates the restricted nature of metaphysical modality. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: His drift is that metaphyical modality is restricted, but expressing it in S5 modal logic (where all worlds see one another) makes it unrestricted, so S5 logic is wrong for metaphysics. I'm impressed by his arguments. |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: If one confines one's sights to genuinely possible worlds, disavowing the impossible worlds, then metaphysical modality emerges as the limiting case - the 'unrestricted' modality that takes account of 'every' world - and S5 emerges as its proper logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: He observes that this makes metaphysical modality 'restricted' simply because you have restricted what 'all worlds' means. Could there be non-maximal worlds? Are logical and metaphysical modality coextensive? I think I like the S5 view. |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: A mythology gave us the idea that metaphysical necessity is truth in every world whatsoever, without restriction. But the notion of metaphysical modality comes first, and, like every notion of modality, it is restricted. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: With its freedom from the constraint of metaphysical possibility, logical necessity may be construed as accommodating all the axioms and rules of S5. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to raise problems for this simple thought. The big question: what are the limits of what is actually possible? Compare: what are the limits of what is imaginable? what are the limits of what is meaningfully sayable? |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Intransitive relations are introduced into modal semantics for the purposes of interpreting various 'real' or restricted types of modalities, such as nomological necessity. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that the (so-called) 'laws of nature' are held to change from world to world, so necessity in one could peter out in some more remote world, rather than being carried over everywhere. A very Humean view of such things. |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The real meanings of the simple modal terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are not the same as the concepts of actual necessity and actual possibility, necessity and possibility according to the actual world. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: If you were an 'actualist' (who denies everything except the actual world) then you are unlikely to agree with this. In unrestricted possible worlds, being true in one world makes it possible in all worlds. So actual necessity is possible everywhere. |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Total ways things cannot be are also 'worlds', or maximal ways for things to be. They are impossible worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: This unorthodox view doesn't sound too plausible to me. To think of a circular square as a 'way things could be' sounds pretty empty, and mere playing with words. The number 7 could be the Emperor of China? |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!) |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: If one ignores impossible worlds, then ways things might have been are the only ways for things to be that are left. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: Impossible worlds are included in 'ways for things to be', but excluded from 'ways things might have been'. I struggle with a circle being square as a 'way for circles to be'. I suppose being the greatest philosopher is a way for me to be. |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means. |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: I conceive of possible worlds as certain sorts of maximal abstract entities according to which certain things (facts, states of affairs) obtain and certain other things do not obtain. They are total ways things might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or ¬p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on. |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3) | |
| A reaction: Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'. |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Instinctively we divide mankind into friends and foes - friends, towards whom we have a morality of co-operation; foes, towards whom we have that of competition. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, because I have though of cooperation and competition as intrinsic features of people, internal to their nature, but this idea observes that it is more external, as two responses to two sharply distinct aspects of experience. |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: At a later stage in the development of civilization, a new kind of loyalty began to be developed, based on identity of creed. …Its military strength was displayed in Islam …and later loyalities of Catholics or Protestants could outweigh nationality. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The only examples of creed loyalty that come to mind are religious. With increased migration in the modern world the phenomenon of divided loyalties has grown. Can a political theory cope with divided loyalties? |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| Full Idea: From early days down to modern times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: It is a feature of modern nationalism to try to generate fear of various outsiders, even in times of peace. Most of us despise such things, but the underlying desire for greater national unity is not unworthy. What enemies would a world state have? |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In historical societies such as ancient Egypt only a minority at the top of the social scale - the king, the aristocracy and the priests - needed any psychological mechanism towards social cohesion; all the rest merely obeyed. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is why even now I take obedience to be a key right-wing virtue, though it is usually reinforced through national myths and distorted proganda. Quasi-worship of the leader also seems to be a major ingredient. Obedience unifies armies. |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Short of the whole planet there is no visible limit to the advantages of size, both in economic and in political organisation. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: Obviously there are also disadvantages, such as the vast distances, and the alienation of people far from the centre. I take economies of scale to be one of the advantages of socialist nationalisations. |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Government has a negative function, to prevent private violence, to protect life and property, to enact criminal law and secure its enforcement. It also has a positive purpose, to facilitate the realisation of desires common to most of the citizens. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Interesting because the second purpose is rarely cited. Governments improve communications, facilitate trade, and encourage health and education services, which we all want. |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| Full Idea: At a very early stage loyalty to a group must have been reinforced by loyalty to a leader. In a large tribe the king or chief may be known the everybody even when individuals are strangers. This makes possible increase in the size of the group. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: In this way humanity could move from hunter-gatherer groups to tribes or clans. In the UK even people who couldn't name the current Prime Minister are all fully aware of the monarch. In this way a merely constitutional monarch makes sense, |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The general principle of delimiting powers should be to leave to smaller bodies all functions which do not prevent larger bodies from fulfilling their purpose. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: In recent years in the UK smaller local bodies have been severely reduced in power by central government. This is nominally in favour of individuals, but in practice seems to have strengthened the centre. Russell was keen on devolving powers. |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is obvious that in a state of anarchy there could not be universities or scientific research or publication of books, or even such simple things as seaside holidays. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: A seaside holiday seems possible, though it obviously needs means of publicity, and of transport. Why is a private university impossible? The general thought seems to be that anything very complex would be impossible. Maybe. |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The control of greedy or predatory impulses is imperatively necessary, and therefore States …are needed for survival. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: The anarchist replies that the corruption of this benevolent state is precisely the problem they are trying to avoid. Perhaps the emphasis should be on the rule of law, rather than on people holding centralised power. |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy you have a 20 millionth share in the government of others, but only a 20 millionth share in the government of yourself. You are therefore much more conscious of being governed than of governing. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Add to that the fact that your share in governing others only occurs at election time. In between we are powerless spectators, but we are still governed. |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Nationalisation leaves managers and officials almost as remote from the workers as they are under a capitalist regime. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Russell's solution is workplace democracy. Presumably that could be imposed on a nationalised industry much more easily than on a profit-driven private capitalist industry. |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Economic justice is held by Socialists (rightly, in my opinion) to involve state ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: This must be to obtain greater control over the profits of industry, and also to prevent trade become too exploitative of weaker foreign nations. Britain had a socialist government when this book was written. |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A society in which each is the slave of all is only a little better than one in which each is the slave of a despot. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to apply quite accurately to the position of those state employees who have the lowest status and wages. Society as a whole exploits them, so it is hard to point the finger at their oppressors. |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The introduction of slavery began the divorce between the purpose of the work and the purposes of the worker. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Worth saying, because marxists tend to blame more recent capitalism for creating this problem (of 'alienation'). There are many degrees of slavery. |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is equality where all are slaves, as well as where all are free. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation, though a person is only a slave if someone controls them, so it is not strictly true. |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is a risk that, in the pursuit of equality, good things which there is difficulty in distributing evenly may not be admitted to be good. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Lovely sentence. The clarity and economy with which he expresses an intricate idea. Why can't you philosophers all write like that? This is not just the unequal distribution of scarce goods, but a subtler problem. The finest wines, for example. |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Justice has come to be interpreted as equality, except where exceptional merit is thought to deserve an exceptional but still moderate reward. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: Kekes rebels against this modern distortion of justice, which traditionally means everyone getting what they deserve - good or bad. The modern egalitarian view seems to be a rebellion against the harsh interpretation of the older view. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |