28 ideas
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by use of some descriptive phrase, such as 'author of these works'. But once we have this reference fixed, we then use the name 'Cicero' rigidly to designate the man who in fact we have identified by his authorship. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.183) | |
| A reaction: Even supposedly rigid names can shift reference, as Evans's example of 'Madagascar' shows (Idea 9041). Reference is a much more social activity than Kripke is willing to admit. There is a 'tradition' of reference (Dummett) for the name 'Cicero'. |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: The function of names is simply to refer. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.167) | |
| A reaction: This is Kripke reverting to the John Stuart Mill view of names. If I say "you are a right Casanova" I don't simply refer to Casanova. In notorious examples like 'Homer' reference is fine, but the object of reference is a bit elusive. |
| 9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Although the statement that this table (if it exists at all) was not made of ice, is necessary, it certainly is not something that we know a priori. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.180) | |
| A reaction: One of the key thoughts in modern philosophy. Kit Fine warns against treating it as a new and exciting toy, but it is a new and exciting toy. Scientific essentialism, which I so want to be true, is built on this proposal. |
| 9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: By 'rigid designator' I mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971]) | |
| A reaction: I am persistently troubled by the case of objects which are slightly different in another possible world. Does 'Aristotle' refer to him as young or old? Might the very same man have had a mole on his cheek? |
| 9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: It seems that we cannot say "Nixon might have been a different man from the man he in fact was", unless we mean it metaphorically. He might have been a different sort of person. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.176) | |
| A reaction: The problem is that being a 'different sort of person' could become more and more drastic, till Nixon is unrecognisable. I don't see how I can stipulate that a small and dim mouse is Richard Nixon, even in a possible world with magicians. |
| 9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Statements about the modal properties of this table never refer to counterparts. However, if someone confuses the epistemological problems and the metaphysical problems he will be well on the way to the counterpart theory of Lewis. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.184 n16) | |
| A reaction: I can't make out what we should say about a possible object which is very nearly this table. Kripke needs the table to have a clear and unwavering essence, but tables are not that sort of thing. How would Kripke define 'physical object'? |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190) | |
| A reaction: The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't. |
| 9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: 'Heat' is a rigid designator, which is picked out by the contingent property of being felt in a certain way; pain, on the other hand, is picked out by an essential (indeed necessary and sufficient) property. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190 n19) | |
| A reaction: Hm. I could pick out your pain by your contingent whimpering behaviour. I can spot my own potential pain by a combination of bodily damage and pain killing tablets. I suspect him of the same blunder as Descartes on this one. |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Instinctively we divide mankind into friends and foes - friends, towards whom we have a morality of co-operation; foes, towards whom we have that of competition. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, because I have though of cooperation and competition as intrinsic features of people, internal to their nature, but this idea observes that it is more external, as two responses to two sharply distinct aspects of experience. |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: At a later stage in the development of civilization, a new kind of loyalty began to be developed, based on identity of creed. …Its military strength was displayed in Islam …and later loyalities of Catholics or Protestants could outweigh nationality. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The only examples of creed loyalty that come to mind are religious. With increased migration in the modern world the phenomenon of divided loyalties has grown. Can a political theory cope with divided loyalties? |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| Full Idea: From early days down to modern times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: It is a feature of modern nationalism to try to generate fear of various outsiders, even in times of peace. Most of us despise such things, but the underlying desire for greater national unity is not unworthy. What enemies would a world state have? |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In historical societies such as ancient Egypt only a minority at the top of the social scale - the king, the aristocracy and the priests - needed any psychological mechanism towards social cohesion; all the rest merely obeyed. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is why even now I take obedience to be a key right-wing virtue, though it is usually reinforced through national myths and distorted proganda. Quasi-worship of the leader also seems to be a major ingredient. Obedience unifies armies. |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Short of the whole planet there is no visible limit to the advantages of size, both in economic and in political organisation. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: Obviously there are also disadvantages, such as the vast distances, and the alienation of people far from the centre. I take economies of scale to be one of the advantages of socialist nationalisations. |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Government has a negative function, to prevent private violence, to protect life and property, to enact criminal law and secure its enforcement. It also has a positive purpose, to facilitate the realisation of desires common to most of the citizens. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Interesting because the second purpose is rarely cited. Governments improve communications, facilitate trade, and encourage health and education services, which we all want. |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| Full Idea: At a very early stage loyalty to a group must have been reinforced by loyalty to a leader. In a large tribe the king or chief may be known the everybody even when individuals are strangers. This makes possible increase in the size of the group. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
| A reaction: In this way humanity could move from hunter-gatherer groups to tribes or clans. In the UK even people who couldn't name the current Prime Minister are all fully aware of the monarch. In this way a merely constitutional monarch makes sense, |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The general principle of delimiting powers should be to leave to smaller bodies all functions which do not prevent larger bodies from fulfilling their purpose. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: In recent years in the UK smaller local bodies have been severely reduced in power by central government. This is nominally in favour of individuals, but in practice seems to have strengthened the centre. Russell was keen on devolving powers. |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is obvious that in a state of anarchy there could not be universities or scientific research or publication of books, or even such simple things as seaside holidays. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: A seaside holiday seems possible, though it obviously needs means of publicity, and of transport. Why is a private university impossible? The general thought seems to be that anything very complex would be impossible. Maybe. |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The control of greedy or predatory impulses is imperatively necessary, and therefore States …are needed for survival. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: The anarchist replies that the corruption of this benevolent state is precisely the problem they are trying to avoid. Perhaps the emphasis should be on the rule of law, rather than on people holding centralised power. |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy you have a 20 millionth share in the government of others, but only a 20 millionth share in the government of yourself. You are therefore much more conscious of being governed than of governing. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Add to that the fact that your share in governing others only occurs at election time. In between we are powerless spectators, but we are still governed. |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A society in which each is the slave of all is only a little better than one in which each is the slave of a despot. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to apply quite accurately to the position of those state employees who have the lowest status and wages. Society as a whole exploits them, so it is hard to point the finger at their oppressors. |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Nationalisation leaves managers and officials almost as remote from the workers as they are under a capitalist regime. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Russell's solution is workplace democracy. Presumably that could be imposed on a nationalised industry much more easily than on a profit-driven private capitalist industry. |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Economic justice is held by Socialists (rightly, in my opinion) to involve state ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: This must be to obtain greater control over the profits of industry, and also to prevent trade become too exploitative of weaker foreign nations. Britain had a socialist government when this book was written. |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The introduction of slavery began the divorce between the purpose of the work and the purposes of the worker. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Worth saying, because marxists tend to blame more recent capitalism for creating this problem (of 'alienation'). There are many degrees of slavery. |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is equality where all are slaves, as well as where all are free. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation, though a person is only a slave if someone controls them, so it is not strictly true. |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is a risk that, in the pursuit of equality, good things which there is difficulty in distributing evenly may not be admitted to be good. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: Lovely sentence. The clarity and economy with which he expresses an intricate idea. Why can't you philosophers all write like that? This is not just the unequal distribution of scarce goods, but a subtler problem. The finest wines, for example. |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Justice has come to be interpreted as equality, except where exceptional merit is thought to deserve an exceptional but still moderate reward. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
| A reaction: Kekes rebels against this modern distortion of justice, which traditionally means everyone getting what they deserve - good or bad. The modern egalitarian view seems to be a rebellion against the harsh interpretation of the older view. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |