13 ideas
| 22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
| A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things? |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Maybe peaceful co-existence between absolute logical necessity and absolute metaphysical necessity can be secured, ..and absolute necessity is their union. ...However, a truth would then qualify as absolutely necessary in two quite different ways. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 4) | |
| A reaction: Hale is addressing a really big question for metaphysic (absolute necessity) which others avoid. In the end he votes for rejecting 'metaphysical' necessity. I am tempted to vote for rejecting logical necessity (as being relative). 'Absolute' is an ideal. |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary. |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| Full Idea: One type of necessity may be said to be 'stronger' than another when the first always entails the second, but not conversely. This will obtain only if the possibility of the first is weaker than the possibility of the second. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: Thus we would normally say that if something is logically necessary (a very strong claim) then it will have to be naturally necessary. If something is naturally possible, then clearly it will have to be logically possible. Sounds OK. |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Necessity is 'relative' if a claim of φ-necessary that p just claims that it is a logical consequence of some statements Φ that p. We have a 'strong' version if we add that the statements in Φ are all true, and a 'weak' version if not. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about 'logical' consequence here. It may be necessary that a thing be a certain way in order to qualify for some category (which would be 'relative'), but that seems like 'sortal' necessity rather than logical. |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2) | |
| A reaction: We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity. |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: 'Broadly' logical necessities are propositions whose truth derives entirely from the concepts involved in them (together, of course, with relevant structure). | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: Is the 'logical' part of this necessity bestowed by the concepts, or by the 'structure' (which I take to be a logical structure)? |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The logical necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.10) | |
| A reaction: This is part of his story of essences giving rise to necessities. His proposal sounds narrow, but logical concepts may have the highest degree of generality which it is possible to have. It must be how the concepts connect that causes the necessities. |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9) | |
| A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'. |
| 18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17 | |
| A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope. |
| 18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
| A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |