13417
|
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
|
|
Full Idea:
If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.
|
|
From:
Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.
|
12714
|
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
|
|
A reaction:
The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
|
12743
|
A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
|
|
A reaction:
Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
|