10 ideas
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is not verified by the observation that numbers have interesting essential properties, since they are properties of classes and so are entities of a higher logical type than individuals. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
A reaction: This relies on a particular view of number (which might be challenged), but is interesting when it comes to abstract entities having essences. Only ur-elements in set theory could have essences, it seems. Why? Rising in type destroys essence? |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism says some individuals have certain 'interesting' necessary properties. If it exists, it has that property. The properties are 'interesting' as had in virtue of their own peculiar natures, rather than as general necessary truths. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is a modern commentator caught between two views. The idea that essence is the non-trivial-necessary properties is standard, but adding their 'peculiar natures' connects him to Aristotle, and Kit Fine's later papers. Good! |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
Full Idea: There is a tendency to think of essential properties as having some characteristic in addition to their necessity, such as intrinsicality. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to take this view of all properties, and not just the 'essential' ones. General necessities, relations, categorisations, disjunctions etc. should not be called 'properties', even if they are 'predicates'. Huge confusion results. |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism entails the existence of necessary singular propositions that are not instances of necessary generalizations. Therefore, since there are no such propositions, essentialism is false. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This summarises the attack which McMichael wishes to deal with. I am wickedly tempted to say that essences actually have a contingent existence (or a merely hypothetical dependent necessity), and this objection might be grist for my mill. |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The question about minds is whether 1) physical and psychical laws are independent (monism, my neutralism), 2) the psychical laws derived and physical laws primordial (materialism), 3) physical law is derived, psychical law primordial (idealism). | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.321) | |
A reaction: I think you are already in trouble when you start proposing that there are two quite distinct sets of laws, and then worry about how they are related. Assume unity, and only separate them when the science forces you to (which it won't). |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the most manifest and characteristic. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.319) | |
A reaction: This is the view of laws of nature now associated with Nancy Cartwright, but presumably you can explain the apparent chaos in terms of the intersection of vast numbers of 'laws'. Or, better, there aren't any laws. |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Individuals appear to enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
A reaction: This is a very significant chicken-or-egg issue. The remark seems to offer the vision of pre-existing general laws, which individuals then join (like joining a club). But surely the laws are derived from the individuals? Where else could they come from? |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance, and the destruction of bad results. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.320) | |
A reaction: The 'destruction of bad results' is a much better slogan for Darwin that Spencer's 'survival of the fittest'. It is, of course, a rather unattractive God who makes progress by endlessly destroying huge quantities of failed (but living) experiments. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |