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7746
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We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
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Full Idea:
If Tully=Cicero is synthetic, the names must have different senses, which seems implausible, for we don't normally think of proper names as having senses in the way that predicates do (we do not, e.g., give definitions of proper names).
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From:
John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.89)
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A reaction:
It is probably necessary to prize apart the question of whether Tully 'has' (intrinsically) a sense, from whether we think of Tully in that way. Stacks of books have appeared about this one, since Kripke.
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7747
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How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
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Full Idea:
It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?
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From:
John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91)
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A reaction:
This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point.
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14212
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A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
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A reaction:
This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
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14213
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Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
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A reaction:
[compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
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14210
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A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
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A reaction:
In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
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14209
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Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
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A reaction:
(The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
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