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15537
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If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
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From:
David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
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A reaction:
He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).
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16700
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In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
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Full Idea:
It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
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From:
John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
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A reaction:
This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?
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16701
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To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
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Full Idea:
If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
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From:
John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
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A reaction:
An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.
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15539
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Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
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From:
David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
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A reaction:
Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.
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