69 ideas
7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author, and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir, ...with moral intentions being the real germ of its life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
A reaction: This attitude is what places Nietzsche as the parent of post-modernism, and is the reason why most 'continental' philosophers seem to have given up the attempt to simply reason about life. It is anti-Enlightenment, and it is wicked. |
7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche famously defines metaphysics as the division of one world into two; the unity of the mythical pre-philosophical experience of the world is sundered, with Plato, into being and seeming, reality and appearance, supersensible and sensible. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
A reaction: (Critchley doesn't give a reference; Idea 2860 is close). This is the discredited status that metaphysics gradually acquired after Kant, but I see modern metaphysics as reuniting human thought by digging down to the foundations to reveal roots and links. |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7) | |
A reaction: ...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics. |
11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'? ...Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth stepped before us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §001) | |
A reaction: I think this is one of the great moments in philosophy, when something that has been taken for granted, as a kind of mantra, is suddenly looked in the face and challenged. Truth at all costs? What sacrifices would you make for truth? |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment. |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
Full Idea: In a bold manouevre Armstrong posited a metaphysically primitive relation of necessitation, and then defined truth-makers in terms of this bridging relation, as a thing that necessitates something being true. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.2 | |
A reaction: [Not sure of page reference] Spelled out so clearly by MacBride, this sounds dubious. How many truths are necessitated by the City of London? Do truthmakers necessitate the existence of their truths? MacBride says it's a circular theory. |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Postulate a higher-order state of affairs, of all the states of affairs in which Theaetetus is involved. Is this not a good candidate for a truthmaker for the negative truth that 'Theaetetus is not flying'? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems extravagant to need the whole universe to make true 'there are no lions in this room'. But for 'there are no unicorns' it is not clear which states of affairs unicorns are involved. (Armstrong is aware of this). |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Each of the arctic animals is by its nature different from a penguin, so this general state of affairs seems truthmaker enough for this negative existential. Similarly, the totality of all birds eliminates the phoenix. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Why is it 'animals' in one case, and 'birds' in the other? What if there was no life in arctic? Would the snow then do the job? This doesn't seem to work. |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A mathematical entity exists if and only if it is possible that there be instantiations of that structure. This transforms the question of truthmakers for the existence of mathematical entities into a question of truthmakers for certain possibilities. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.3) | |
A reaction: This modal approach to structuralism [for which he endorses Hellman 1989] opens up a modal approach to other truthmakers, which places dispositions at the centre of physical truthmaking. No sets of Meinongian objects? |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is possible that there could have been nothing. ...What would be its truthmaker? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.4) | |
A reaction: I suppose the truthmaker here is the whole of reality, with its dispositions and contingencies. But that won't do for 'possibly there might never have been anything'. In such a case there wouldn't be any truths. |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It seems reasonable to say that a truthmaker for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the truth that the contradictory of that truth is possible. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.2) | |
A reaction: The truthmaker will have to be not only some fact, but also the additional fact that it is contingent, in order to generate the possibility of the contradictory. |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The obvious minimal truthmaker for the truth that 'it is possible that a unicorn exists' is combinatorial. The elements of the combination are all that is needed. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that there are no possibilities which are not combinations of what currently exists. |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
Full Idea:
The mereological sum of what happens to be all the men does not necessitate that it is all the men. So if truthmaking involves necessitation, then this object cannot be the complete truthmaker for |
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From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.1) | |
A reaction: [He invokes Russell has his source] His point is that the truthmaker needs a further fact, beyond the men, which specifies that this is all of them. But only if truthmakers necessitate their truths (as Armstrong claims). I'm sympathetic to both claims. |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The idea is that braces { } attribute to an entity the place-holding, or perhaps determinable, property of unithood. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.5) | |
A reaction:
I like this. There is Socrates himself, then there is my concept |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
Full Idea:
The null class is useful in formal set theory, but I hope that does not require that there be a thing called the null class which is truthmaker for the strange proposition |
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From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear why it doesn't, but then it is not quite clear to philosophers what the status of the null set is, in comparison with sets that have members. |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Classes, because they have a particular cardinality, are essentially a certain number of ones, things that, within the particular class, are each taken as a unit. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: [Singletons are exceptions] So units are basic to set theory, which is the foundations of technical analytic philosophy (as well as, for many, of mathematics). If you can't treat something as a unit, it won't go into set theory. Vagueness... |
7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche's work is a resistance to nihilism. This is why he insists that new categories and values are required that would permit us to endure this world of becoming without either falling into despair or inventing some new god and bowing before it. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
A reaction: The trouble is that all Nietzsche offers is the invention of values out of nothing by some wretched Germanic übermensch who is obsessed with militarism and dominance. If values don't grow out of human nature, then 'all is permitted'. |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative... |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example. |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There must exist states of affairs as truthmakers, to get us beyond 'loose and separate' entities. ...They can be bundles of tropes, or trope-with-particular, or bundles of universals ('compresence'), or instantiations. They are an addition to ontology. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.5) | |
A reaction: Armstrong is the great champion of states of affairs. They seem rather vague to me, and disconcertingly timeless. |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them. |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful. |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Length is a 'determinable' property; being some particular length, such as a mile, is one of its 'determinates'. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: The seem to be 'type' and 'token' properties, except that this other vocabulary indicates the link between them. |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: 'Non-transferable' theories of tropes hold that the mass is of this stone by necessity. It is an identity condition for the property. Every property then becomes an essential property. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Martin and Heil for this view] It is hard to see in this proposal how the trope is in any way separate from its substance, and hence it seems a bit of a vacuous theory. (The other theories of properties aren't much cop either). |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Properties are not powers. But properties have powers. They bestow powers. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. In this view, powers become extremely vague things, ranging from the fine-grained to the hugely broad. It seems to me that powers are precise and real, but properties are the vague unhelpful things. |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Powers must surely issue in manifestations that are something more than just powers. A world where potency never issued in act, but only in more potency, would be one where one travelled without ever having the possibility of arriving. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Tricky. The picture I favour is that the distinction between powers and categorical properties is a misunderstanding. What is fundamental is active and powerful categoricals. |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around. |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For a Class Nominalist 'the class of all 4-kilo objects' is the truthmaker for the truth that the particular has just that mass. Yet this looks far too big! Would not the object still be four kilos even if the other members of the class had never existed? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This seems so obvious to me as to be hardly worth saying. To identify redness with the class of red entities just seems crazy. Why do they belong in that class? Armstrong is illustrating the value of the truthmaker idea in philosophy. |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is 'partial identity' where one entity contains another with something to spare, or else where entities overlap each other. ...Extensive quantities, such as length and mass, are the particularly plausible cases. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.5) | |
A reaction: This looks like a very useful concept which deserves wider use. It will help discussions of rivers, statues, intersecting roads etc. |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It seems natural and plausible to say that it is the fact that a necessary truth is itself necessary that determines its truth in all possible worlds. This intension determines its extension across possible worlds. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Well said. To me (but not to Armstrong) this implies essentialism, that the necessity arises from the intrinsic natures of the things involved. The whole Lewisian approach of explaining things by mapping them strikes me as wrong. |
2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We do not see a tree exactly and entire with regard to its leaves, branches, colour and shape; it is so much easier for us to see an approximation of a tree. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §192) |
20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. To what extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving. Our fundamental tendency is to assert that our falsest judgements are the most indispensable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §004) | |
A reaction: This is the standard objection to pragmatism, that what is false may still be useful, and that clever blighter Nietzsche embraces the idea! |
2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The real problems of morality come into view only if we compare many moralities. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §186) |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: General truths are a species of negative truth, 'no more' truths, asserting that there are no more men than the mortal ones, no more ravens than the black ones. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.1) | |
A reaction: He goes on to distinguish between 'absences' and 'limits' in this area. |
20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To know 'who he is', we must know the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relative to one another. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
A reaction: This is clearly an essentialist view of a person, as having a 'nature', which is 'inner', and which we can try to specify. Ranking drives and values seems a good proposal for getting at it. I'm also intrigued by what people find interesting. |
2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §017) | |
A reaction: A wonderful remark (which I have since found in Schopenhauer). I don't see how the most enthusiastic free will libertarian can deny it. |
2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The desire for 'freedom of will' is nothing less than the desire to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §021) |
20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Psychology is now once again the road to the fundamental problems. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §023) | |
A reaction: This may become the epigraph of my great book, which will have as working title 'The Psychology of Metaphysics'. If you trawl through this collection, you will see where I am going! (A tough job, but easier than reading Hegel). |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The thesis of 'expressibility' says that for all being, there is a proposition (perhaps one never formulated by any mind at any time) that truly renders the existence and nature of this being. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3.2) | |
A reaction: [He credits Stephen Read 2000:68-9 for this] Armstrong accepts this, but I deny it. I can't make any sense of this vast plethora of propositions, each exactly expressing some minute nuance of the infinity complexity of all being. |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: We could not stand in any causal or nomic relation to a realm of propositions over and above the space-time world, ...so it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.6) | |
A reaction: I agree, and I like Armstrong's appeal to explanation as a criterion for whether we should make an ontological commitment here. I am baffled by anyone who thinks reality is crammed full of unarticulated propositions. Only a philosopher.... |
2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The worst, most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist's error, namely Plato's invention of pure spirit and the good in itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) | |
A reaction: A landmark observation about the history of philosophy. Imagine if all the Aristotle had survived, but all the Plato had been lost. |
1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that by elevating the importance of the mind, Plato downplayed the wonders of the body, and by searching for a timeless Truth he degraded the indisputable fact of human temporality. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. X | |
A reaction: Both ideas are very important. The second is widely misunderstood. Nietzsche was not a denier of truth. He asked us to scrutinise the role and value we assign to truth. |
2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
A reaction: So do criminals |
23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche wants to judge actions not by what is done, but by the nature of the person who does them, and that is poisonous. We have to be horrified by what is done by Hitler and Stalin, without inquiring into their psychology. | |
From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot p.37 | |
A reaction: She says morality should focus on social needs, not on spontaneity, energy and passion. Nietzsche was very much a product of romanticism. Some of Nietzsche's heroes are military conquerors, so I think she is right. |
2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §153) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the conventional morality of his contemporary society. Nietzsche clearly thought that actions motivated by love are intrinsically good. (Apart from murders by the jealous!). |
2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You Stoics want to "live according to nature"? Oh you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Nature is prodigal and indifferent beyond measure - how could you live by such indifference? Living is wanting to be other than nature. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §009) | |
A reaction: I think this is simply indicative of the slide from optimism to pessimism about nature in the intervening centuries. Stoics thought nature rational. See 'King Lear' for the transition. |
2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts. |
2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Throughout the longest part of history ('prehistoric times') the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences. …but now men are unanimous that the value of an action is in the intention behind it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §032) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Kant's fault. No one thinks that a reckless or malicios action is innocent if no actual harm results. |
2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble soul has reverence for itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §287) |
20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All moralities are baroque and unreasonable ...because they address themselves to 'all', because they generalise where one must not generalise. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §198) | |
A reaction: 'Particularism' is a recent label, but one finds passing remarks from many earlier philosophers which support that approach to ethics. No one was ever more opposed to strict moral rules than Nietzsche. |
2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: May I be forgiven for the discovery that 'virtue' has been harmed by nothing more than it has been by the boringness of its advocates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §228) |
20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To remain master of one's four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §284) | |
A reaction: Compare this with 'Daybreak (Dawn)' 556. Solitude is the surprising addition, defended as the urge to 'cleanliness', when since humanity is 'unclean'. |
2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An act of pity was during the finest age of Rome considered neither good nor bad. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §201) |
2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What does the claim that there exists in us a categorical imperative say of the man who asserts it? …that 'what is worthy of respect in me is that I know how to obey - and things ought to be no different with you'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §187) |
2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §261) |
2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203) |
2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The thought of suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets through many a bad night. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §157) |
7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: In the 1880s Nietzsche diagnosed the concept of nihilism for a whole range of continental thinkers: the recognition of the subject's freedom goes hand in hand with the collapse of moral certainty in the world. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Avoiding this dilemma is just one of the many bonuses offered to those who abandon the idea of free will. The fact that one can decide to be wicked doesn't bring an end to morality. Philosophers should think more concretely about human life. |
2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §062) |
6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche thinks that the human condition is precisely to overcome itself; we continually remake ourselves. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.261 | |
A reaction: This is why I think of Nietzsche as a straightforwardly existentialist philosopher. There is a crucial distinction between 'remaking' ourselves and 'realising all our possibilities'. The latter seems right. Which view did Nietzsche take? |
20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is an ideal ...of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is, but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §056) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the main point of the idea of eternal recurrence. Could we inculcate this vision into the teenagers of our nation - that they should each try to design for themselves a life which they would be happy to endlessly repeat? Hm. |
20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every elevation of the type 'man' has thitherto been the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §257) | |
A reaction: The aim of 'elevating the type "man"' does not figure in works of political philosophy very much! I doubt whether one could base a political party on the idea, and win a general election. Could the people still be sold the idea of aristocracy? |
20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A good and healthy aristocracy ...accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §258) | |
A reaction: Something similar might be said of a democracy - that a slavelike workforce is needed to create the great universal goods we all want and need. Do the aristocrats want sacrifices for great art, or for wild parties and fox hunting? |
22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To us the democratic movement is ...a form of decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203), quoted by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche: the Revaluation of Values p.88 | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a society of natural aristocrats followed by sheep would increase the value of mankind. Nor if the talented people are given total freedom, and the rest of us are servants. The value of humanity cannot reside in a few individuals. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Is it not very plausible that negative causations supervene on the positive causations together with the laws that govern the positive causations? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.3) | |
A reaction: This obviously has a naturalistic appeal, since all causation can then be based on the actual world. |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical present will be a strict instant, or, if time is not infinitely divisible, the present will be a minimum granule of duration. But strict instants or minimal granules of duration, if these exist, cannot be experienced. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 11) | |
A reaction: He points out that this is ironic, since Presentism lies on the basic experience of the present. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christianity is Platonism for the people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) |