20 ideas
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
Full Idea: I believe it is worth considering imaginary cases (such as Teletransportation), as we can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that we might say that IF I were suddenly turned into a pig, then I would come to believe in dualism, but that will not and cannot happen, because dualism is false. It seems essential to accept the natural possibility of the case. |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.'). | |
From: report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction. |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be (as in an 'identity crisis'). But when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293) | |
A reaction: I think it is important to note that the philosophical problem breaks down into two areas: whether I have numerical identity with myself over time, and whether other people have it. It may be that two different sets of criteria will emerge. |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314) | |
A reaction: I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings. |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: We should revise our view about identity over time: what matters isn't that there will be someone alive who will be me; it is rather that there should be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.316) | |
A reaction: Parfit and Locke seem to agree on this, and it is no accident that they both like 'science fiction' examples. Apparently Parfit wouldn't bat an eyelid if someone threatened to cut his corpus callosum. I rate it as a catastrophe for my current existence. |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If I am largely paralysed, and my twin brother is dying of brain disease, then if the operation to graft my head onto his body is offered, I should accept the operation, and it is irrelevant whether this person would be me. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.308) | |
A reaction: Parfit notes that the brain is a particularly significant part of the process. The fact that I might cheerfully accept this offer without philosophical worries doesn't get rid of the question 'who is this person?' Who should they remain married to? |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so. |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
Full Idea: It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I have the same audio system, and also whether I exist if half of my body were simultaneously replaced. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.302) | |
A reaction: It is impossible to deny this, if the part replaced is not the brain. My doubt about Parfit's thesis is that while I may not care whether some modified thing is still me, my lawyers and the police might be very concerned. |
20086 | Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: In the twenty-first century, sovereignty, once the basis of the nation state, has become a relative concept. ...Powerlessness is the key word of our time. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 1 'Crisis') | |
A reaction: The point is that nation states now have limited power, in the face of larger unions, multinational companies, and global problems. |
20090 | Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Imagine having to develop a system today that would express the will of the people. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'electoral') | |
A reaction: Our recent Brexit referendum didn't do the job, because it was confined to a single question. Van Reybrouck laughs at the idea of expressing it through a polling both. How about a council of 500, drawn by lots? Meet for three months. |
20087 | There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as one monolithic 'people' (every society has its diversity), nor is there anything that could be described as a 'national gut feeling'. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'populism') | |
A reaction: Rousseau yearned for a republic no bigger than Geneva. I don't see why we should give up on the general will in huge modern societies. It is likely, though, to be an anodyne lowest common denominator. No bad thing, perhaps. |
20089 | Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Efficiency does not automatically generate legitimacy, and faith in the technocrat melts away as soon as spending cuts are implemented. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'democracy') | |
A reaction: They can hang on to legitimacy if they can come up with some technical mumbo-jumbo like 'monetarism' which the people will swallow. |
20088 | Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Technocracy is a system where experts are charged with looking after the public interest. ...Technocrats are managers who replace politicians, so they can concentrate on long-term solutions and announce unpopular measures. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'technocracy') | |
A reaction: I like technocrats. They just need to be accountable. In the UK we have far more respect for the governor of the Bank of England than for any politician. |
20085 | Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Democracy is the least bad form of all governments precisely because it attempts to find a healthy balance between legitimacy and efficiency. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 1 'Crisis') | |
A reaction: There seems to be a widespread feeling that democracy is declining in efficiency, and that may be because our remoteness from government decreases legitimacy, so we have less commitment to getting things done. |
20095 | A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: In a referendum you ask everyone to vote on a subject that usually only a few know anything about. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 4 'remedies') | |
A reaction: Tell me about it! I was forced to vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum, and felt thoroughly out of my depth on such a complex economic question. |
20094 | You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Even with the best of intentions, those who govern the people without involving them, govern them only in a limited sense. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 4 intro) | |
A reaction: But if they are highly involved, who is governing who? Do we want the people to become happier about being governed, or do we want them more involved in doing the governing? |
20093 | In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: The drawing of lots, the most democratic of all political instruments, lost out in the eighteenth century to elections, a procedure that was not invented as a democratic instrument, but as a means of bringing a new non-hereditary aristocracy to power. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 3 'democratisation') | |
A reaction: This is the basic thesis of Van Reybrouck's book. He argues for the extensive use of lots ('sortition') for getting people involved in modern democracies. I love the idea that in a good democracy you get an occasional chance to rule. |
20091 | Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Bernard Manin (1995) revealed how, immediately after the American and French revolutions, the electoral-representative system was chosen with the intention of keeping at bay the tumult of democracy. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 3 'procedure') | |
A reaction: At the time America and France were two of the largest countries in the world, and communication and transport were slow. That has changed. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |