51 ideas
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Theories of truth and theories of predication are closely related: it seems probable that any comprehensive theory of truth will include a theory of predication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: Davidson defends the view that it is this way round. It is tempting to label them both as 'primitive'. Davidson distinguishes a 'theory' about truth from a 'definition'. |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Antirealism, with its limitations of truth to what can be ascertained, deprives truth of its role as an intersubjective standard. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: I like this, because it lifts truth out of individual minds. I take truth to be an ideal - a simple one with little content, which is thus fairly uncontroversial. Truth is the main general purpose of thinking. |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The 'epistemic' view of truth asserts an essential tie to epistemology, and introduces a dependence of truth on what can somehow be verified by finite rational creatures. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This view, which seems to be widely held, strikes me as an elementary confusion. I take truth to be fully successful belief. If you say belief can never be fully successful, then we can't know the truth - but that doesn't destroy the concept of truth. |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The real objection to the correspondence theory of truth is that there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond. (C.I. Lewis challenged defenders to locate the fact or part of reality to which a truth corresponded). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson defended a correspondence view in 'True to the Facts'. Davidson evidently also thinks the same objection applies to claims about truthmakers. If you say 'gold is shiny', the gold is very dispersed, but it is still there. |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The Slingshot argument (of Frege, Church and Gödel) assumes that if two sentences are logically equivalent, they correspond to the same thing, and what a sentence corresponds to is not changed if a singular term is replaced by a coreferring term. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: This obviously won't work for 'Oedipus thinks he ought to marry Jocasta'. Sentences correspond, I presume, to what they are about, which is often a matter of emphasis or phrasing. Hence the Slingshot sounds like nonsense to me. |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Slingshot: 'Scott is the author of Waverley' and 'The number of counties in Utah is twenty-nine' can be rephrased by substitution so that they are both about the number twenty-nine, and are thus correspond to the same thing. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: [my paraphrase of Davidson's quote from Church 1956:24] These sentences clearly do not correspond to the same thing, so something has gone wrong with the idea that logically equivalent sentences have identical correspondents. |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A pure coherence theory of truth says that all sentences in a consistent set of sentences are true. ...I class this with epistemic views, because it ties truth directly to what is believed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Neurath] I would have thought that coherence is rather more than mere consistency. Truths which have nothing whatever in common can be consistent with one another. [but see his p.43 n14] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is easily defined in terms of satisfaction (as Tarski showed), but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation yields a correct account of truth. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson is assessing which is the prior 'primitive' concept, and he votes for truth. A perennial problem in philosophy, and very hard to find reasons for a preference. The axiomatic approach grows from taking truth as primitive. Axioms for satisfaction? |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: That the truth of sentences is defined by appeal to the semantic properties of words suggests that, if we could give an account of the semantic properties of words (essentially, of reference or satisfaction), we would understand the concept of truth. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: If you thought that words were prior to sentences, this might be the route to go. Davidson gives priority to sentences, and so prefers to work from the other end, which treats truth as primitive, and then defines reference and meaning. |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Axioms specify how each unstructured predicate is satisfied by a particular sequence. Then recursive axioms characterise complex sentences built from simpler ones. Closed sentences have no free variables, so true sentences are satisfied by all sequences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: I take 'all sequences' to mean all combinations of objects in the domain. Thus nothing in domain contradicts the satisfied sentences. Hence Tarski's truth is said to be 'true in a model', where the whole system vouches for the sentence. |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is complained that Tarski's definitions do not establish the connection between truth and meaning that many philosophers hold to be essential. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This, of course, was Davidson's big mission - to build on Tarski's theory a view of truth which dovetailed it with theories of meaning and reference. |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There is no indication in Tarski's formal work of what it is that his various truth predicates have in common, and this is part of the content of the concept. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This seems like a good question to raise. If I list all the 'red' things, I can still ask what qualifies them to all appear on the same list. |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The key role of Convention-T in determining that truth, as characterised by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth makes it seem that it is truth rather than reference that is the basic primitive. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: The key strength of Tarski's account is that it specifies the extension of 'true' for a given language (as expressed in a richer meta-language). |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: When we enquire whether a truth definition defines the class of true sentences in a particular language, we are thinking of the truth definition as stipulating a possible language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Thus I might say "Nij wonk yang" is true if and only if snow is white, and make my first step towards a new language. An interesting way of looking at Tarski's project. |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler or more fundamental. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: For redundancy theorists, I suppose, truth would be eliminated in favour of 'assertion'. Replacing it with 'satisfaction' doesn't seem very illuminating. Davidson would say 'reference' is more tricky and elusive than truth. |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is clearly a mistake to call Tarski a disquotationalist. ...We say of a sentence not at hand (such as 'You gave the right answer to this question last night, but I can't remember what you said') that it is true or false. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We can think of 'satisfaction' as a generalised form of reference. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Just the sort of simple point we novices need from the great minds, to help us see what is going on. One day someone is going to explain Tarski's account of truth in plain English, but probably not in my lifetime. |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Causality is a clue to what properties are real. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 9.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting variant on the Shoemaker proposal that properties actually are causal. I'm not sure that there is anything more to causality that the expression in action of properties, which I take to be powers. Structures are not properties. |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
Full Idea: 'Theaetetus is a member of the set of seated objects' doesn't mention the predicate 'sits', but has a new predicate 'is a member of', with no given semantic role. We are back with Plato's problem with the predicate 'instantiates'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Plato's problem is the 'third man' problem - a regress in the explanation. In other words, if we are trying to explain predication, treating predicates as sets gets us nowhere. Just as I always thought. But you have to want explanations. |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Kolmogorov's axiomatisation of probability puts clear constraints on the concept of probability, but leaves open whether probability is further characterised as relative frequency, degree of belief, or something else. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson cites this to show the limitations of axiomatic approaches to any topic (e.g. sets, truth, arithmetic). The item in question must be treated as a 'primitive'. This always has the feeling of second-best. |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: In explaining a phenomenon one can cite the causes of that phenomenon; or one can set the phenomenon in a general theoretical framework. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The thing is, you need to root an explanation in something taken as basic, and theoretical frameworks need further explanation, whereas causes seem to be basic. |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws that are true of it. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This summarises the core of her view in this book. She is after models rather than laws, and the models are based on causes. |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: The covering-law account supposes that there is, in principle, one 'right' explanation for each phenomenon. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the law is held to be 'right', but there must be a bit of flexibility in describing the initial conditions, and the explanandum itself. |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: We explain by ceteris paribus laws, by composition of causes, and by approximations that improve on what the fundamental laws dictate. In all of these cases the fundamental laws patently do not get the facts right. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is rather headline-grabbing to say in this case that laws do not get the facts right. If they were actually 'wrong' and 'lied', there wouldn't be much point in building explanations on them. |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: When different kinds of causes compose, we want to explain what happens in the intersection of different domains. But the laws we use are designed only to tell truly what happens in each domain separately. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since presumably the laws are discovered through experiments which try to separate out a single domain, in those circumstances they actually are true, so they don't 'lie'. |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Much criticism of the original covering-law model objects that it lets in too much. It seems we can explain Henry's failure to get pregnant by his taking birth control pills, and we can explain the storm by the falling barometer. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.0) | |
A reaction: I take these examples to show that true explanations must be largely causal in character. The physicality of causation is what matters, not 'laws'. I'd say the same of attempts to account for causation through counterfactuals. |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of coincidence is somewhere at the back of this thought. Innumerable events have their own explanations, but it is hard to explain their coincidence (see Aristotle's case of bumping into a friend in the market). |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: 'Why does that quail in the garden bob its head up and down in that funny way whenever it walks?' …'Because they all do'. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.5) | |
A reaction: She cites this as an old complaint against the covering-law model of explanation. It captures beautifully the basic error of the approach. We want to know 'why', rather than just have a description of the pattern. 'They all do' is useful information. |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There are a huge number of cases in the history of science where we now know our best explanations were false. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Laudan 1981 for this] The Ptolemaic system and aether are the standard example cited for this. I believe strongly in the importance of best explanation. Only a fool would just accept the best explanation available. Coherence is needed. |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Predicates introduce generality into sentences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this. Most words introduce generality. 'From' is a very general word about direction. 'Dogs bark' is as generally about dogs as it is generally about barking. |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If we give up facts that make entities true, we ought to give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each depends on the legitimacy of the other. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this, because I'm not sure I know what he means by 'representations'. Surely every sentence is 'about' something? Is that just the references within the sentence, but not the sentence as a whole? |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We understand an imperative if and only if we know under what conditions what it orders or commands is obeyed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: How could this be wrong? 'Do you understand the order?' 'Yes sir!' 'Well do it then!' 'Do what sir?' |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An utterance has certain truth conditions only if the speaker intends it to be interpreted as having those truth conditions. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a concession to the rather sensible things that Grice said about meaning. What about malapropisms? Surely there the speaker does not understand the truth conditions of her own utterance? Truth conditions are in the head? |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Meaning depends on use, but it is not easy to say how, for uses to which we may put the utterance of a sentence are endless while its meaning remains fixed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: Quite so. The password is 'Swordfish' (or 'Sweet marjoram', if you prefer). |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Our interest in the parts of sentences is derivative; we recognise at once that sentences are effective linguistic units, while we must figure out or decide what constitutes the meaningful words and particles. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: It depends on whether linguistic priority goes to complete thoughts that require expression, or to naming and ostensive definition to relate to elements of the environment. I find it hard to have a strong view on this one. Just So stories? |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'places' in a predicate is the key to the modern concept of a predicate. Any expression obtained from a sentence by deleting one or more singular terms from the sentence counts as a predicate. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 4) |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: My strategy is to show how our grasp of the concept of truth can explain predication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: His account of the concept of truth centres on Tarski's theory, but he clearly thinks more is needed than the bare bones offered by Tarski. The point, I think, is that predication is what makes a sentence 'truth-apt'. |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The puzzle is that once plausible assignments of semantic roles have been made to parts of sentences, the parts do not seem to compose a united whole. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: It's not clear to me that a sentence does compose a 'whole', given that you can often add or remove bits from sentences, sometimes without changing the meaning. We often, in speech, assemble sentences before we have thought of their full meaning. |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is the essential semantic concept with which to begin a top-down analysis of sentences, since truth, or lack of it, is the most obvious semantic property of sentences, and provides the clearest explanation of judging and conveying information. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed] Presumably this goes with giving sentences semantic priority. The alternative approach is compositional, and is likely to give reference of terms priority over truth of the sentence. But accurate reference is a sort of truth. |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about the concept of humanity, unlike the "equivalent" 'Socrates is human', so they express different propositions. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I like this a lot, because it shows why we should focus on propositions rather than on sentences, or even utterances. And asking what the sentence is 'about' focuses us on the underlying proposition or thought. |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The principle of charity says that it is unavoidable that the pattern of sentences to which a speaker assents reflects the semantics of the logical constants. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: That is not all the principle says, of course. Davidson seems to assume classical logic here, with a bivalent semantics. I wonder if all speakers use 'false' in the normal way, as well as 'true'? Do all languages even contain 'true'? |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The sentences that contain metaphors are typically obviously false or trivially true, because these are typically indications that something is intended as a metaphor. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: A nice point which sounds correct. Metaphors are famous being false, but the 'obvious' falseness signals the metaphor. If a metaphor is only obscurely false, that makes it difficult to read. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: A cause ought to increase the frequency of the effect, but this fact may not show up in the probabilities if other causes are at work. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Patrick Suppes for this one] Presumably in experimental situations you can weed out the interference, but that threatens to eliminate mere 'probability' entirely. |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Nancy Cartwright distinguishes between 'fundamental explanatory laws', which we should not believe, and 'phenomenological laws', which are regularities established on the basis of observation. | |
From: report of Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4 | |
A reaction: The distinction is helpful, so that we can be clearer about what everyone is claiming. We can probably all agree on the phenomenological laws, which are epistemological. Personally I claim truth for the best fundamental explanatory laws. |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Philosophers distinguish phenomenological from theoretical laws. Phenomenological laws are about appearances; theoretical ones are about the reality behind the appearances. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm suspecting that Humeans only really believe in the phenomenological kind. I'm only interested in the theoretical kind, and I take inference to the best explanation to be the bridge between the two. Cartwright rejects the theoretical laws. |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to think that the principles that best organise will be true, nor that the principles that are true will organise much. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, as axiomatisations of the observed patterns in nature. |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Where theories intersect, laws are usually hard to come by. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There are attempts at so-called 'bridge laws', to get from complex theories to simple ones, but her point is well made about theories on the same 'level'. |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To get from a detailed factual knowledge of a situation to an equation, we must prepare the description of the situation to meet the mathematical needs of the theory. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: She is clearly on to something here, as Galileo is blatantly wrong in his claim that the book of nature is written in mathematics. Mathematics is the best we can manage in getting a grip on the chaos. |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: For explanation simple laws must have the same form when they act together as when they act singly. ..But then what the law states cannot literally be true, for the consequences that occur if it acts alone are not what occurs when they act in combination. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.6) | |
A reaction: This is Cartwright's basic thesis. Her point is that the laws 'lie', because they claim to predict a particular outcome which never ever actually occurs. She says we could know all the laws, and still not be able to explain anything. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |