Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Evidentialism' and 'Formal and Material Consequence'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
     Full Idea: The topic-neutrality of logic need not mean there is a pure subject matter for logic; rather, that the logician may need to go everywhere, into mathematics and even into metaphysics.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic')
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
     Full Idea: Maybe some arguments are really only valid when a suppressed premise is made explicit, as when we say that 'taller than' is a transitive concept. ...But what is added by making the hidden premise explicit? It cannot alter the soundness of the argument.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Suppress')
Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
     Full Idea: Belief that every valid argument is valid in virtue of form is a myth. ..Validity is a question of the impossibility of true premises and false conclusion for whatever reason, and some arguments are materially valid and the reason is not purely logical.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic')
     A reaction: An example of a non-logical reason is the transitive nature of 'taller than'. Conceptual connections are the usual example, as in 'it's red so it is coloured'. This seems to be a defence of the priority of semantic consequence in logic.
If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
     Full Idea: In 'A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, so A is taller than C' this can been seen as a matter of meaning - it is part of the meaning of 'taller' that it is transitive, but not of logic. Logic is now seen as the study of formal consequence.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Reduct')
     A reaction: I think I find this approach quite appealing. Obviously you can reason about taller-than relations, by putting the concepts together like jigsaw pieces, but I tend to think of logic as something which is necessarily implementable on a machine.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
     Full Idea: A puzzle about modus ponens is that the major premise is either false or unnecessary: A, If A then B / so B. If the major premise is true, then B follows from A, so the major premise is redundant. So it is false or not needed, and contributes nothing.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres')
     A reaction: Not sure which is the 'major premise' here, but it seems to be saying that the 'if A then B' is redundant. If I say 'it's raining so the grass is wet', it seems pointless to slip in the middle the remark that rain implies wet grass. Good point.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
     Full Idea: The logical connectives are useful for bundling information, that B follows from A, or that one of A or B is true. ..They import no information of their own, but serve to record combinations of other facts.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres')
     A reaction: Anyone who suggests a link between logic and 'facts' gets my vote, so this sounds a promising idea. However, logical truths have a high degree of generality, which seems somehow above the 'facts'.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
     Full Idea: Truth enables us to carry various reports around under certain descriptions ('what Iain said') without all the bothersome detail. Similarly, conditionals enable us to transmit a record of proof without its detail.
     From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres')
     A reaction: This is his proposed Redundancy Theory of conditionals. It grows out of the problem with Modus Ponens mentioned in Idea 14184. To say that there is always an implied 'proof' seems a large claim.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman]
     Full Idea: If it is intellectually required that one try to believe all and only truths (as Chisholm says), ...then it is possible to believe some unsubstantiated proposition in a reckless endeavour to believe a truth, and happen to be right.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Justification')
     A reaction: This implies doxastic voluntarism. Sorry! I meant, this implies that we can control what we believe, when actually we believe what impinges on us as facts.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
     Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic')
     A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.