7 ideas
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea. | |
From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2) | |
A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea. |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F. | |
From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2) | |
A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English. |
23279 | It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits. |
23280 | Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II) | |
A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view. |
23278 | For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I) | |
A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip? |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |