9558
|
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
|
|
Full Idea:
If mathematical statements are part of every competing hypothesis, then no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of observations, they will be part of the best hypothesis. They are not tested, but are a background assumption.
|
|
From:
Elliott Sober (Mathematics and Indispensibility [1993], 45), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
|
|
A reaction:
This is a very nice objection to the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is confirmed by the ongoing successes of science.
|
7634
|
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
|
|
From:
report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
|
|
A reaction:
Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?
|