39 ideas
| 14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old; for no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 122) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this on both accounts. I think the correct age to begin the study of philosophy is four, and it is vital to continue its study up to the point where you can no longer remember your own name. 'Health of the soul' sounds right too. |
| 14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: It is a venerable view that analytic claims do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world, but this claim has often been challenged. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.4) | |
| A reaction: She offers two challenges (bottom p.68), but I would have thought that the best response is that the meanings of the words themselves constitute truthmakers - perhaps via the essence of each word, as Fine suggests. |
| 14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: 'Analytically entail' means entail in virtue of the meanings of the expressions involved and rules of inference. So 'Jones bought a house' analytically entails 'Jones bought a building'. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: Quine wouldn't like this, but it sounds OK to me. Thomasson uses this as a key tool in her claim that common sense objects must exist. |
| 14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: A higher standard for saying that entities exist might require that they play an essential role in explanation, or must figure in any complete causal story, or exist according to some uniform and nonarbitrary principle of composition. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: I am struck by the first of these three. If I am defending the notion that essence depends on Aristotle's account of explanation, then if we add that existence also depends on explanation, we get a criterion for the existence of essences. Yay. |
| 14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Where there are analytic interrelations among our claims, distinct ontological claims may be true without rivalry, redundancy, or reduction. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 10) | |
| A reaction: Thus we might, I suppose, that it is analytically necessary that a lump of clay has a shape, and that a statue be made of something. Interesting. |
| 14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: A theory does not avoid commitment to any entities by avoiding use of certain terms or concepts. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a salutary warning to those who apply the notion of ontological commitment rather naively. |
| 14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: I do not argue that ordinary objects are indispensable, but rather that they are (nearly) unavoidable. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09) | |
| A reaction: Disappointing, given the blurb and title of the book, but put in those terms it will be hard to disagree. Clearly ordinary objects figure in the most useful way for us to talk. I wonder whether we have a clear ontology of 'simples' in which they vanish. |
| 14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The existence conditions for ordinary objects are established by our practices, and they are quite minimal, so it is rather obvious that they are fulfilled, and so there are such things. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.3) | |
| A reaction: This is one of her main arguments. The same argument would have worked for witches or ghosts in certain cultures. |
| 21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Thomasson argues that the existence of ordinary objects follows analytically from the distribution of simples, assuming that there are any simples. It is an analytic truth that if there are simples arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair. | |
| From: report of Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.3 | |
| A reaction: But how do you distinguish when simples are arranged nearly chair-wise from the point where they click into place as actually chair-wise? What is the criterion? |
| 14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The eliminativist cannot claim to have 'discovered' some real existence conditions for chairs beyond those entailed by the semantic rules associated with ordinary use of the word 'chair'. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.3) | |
| A reaction: It is difficult to understand atoms arranged 'chairwise' or 'baseballwise' if you don't already know what a chair or a baseball are. |
| 14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Objections to ordinary objects are the Causal Redundancy claim (objects lack causal powers), the Anti-Colocation view (statues and lumps overlap), Sorites arguments, a more economical ontology, or a more scientific ontology. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of two paragraphs] The chief exponents of these views are Van Inwagen and Merricks. Before you glibly accept ordinary objects, you must focus on producing a really strict ontology. These arguments all have real force. |
| 14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The conventionalist faces paradox if they hold that conventions are logically prior to people (since this plurality requires conventions of individuation), and people are logically prior to conventions (if they make up the conventions). | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: [Sidelle is the spokesman for conventionalism] The best defence would be to deny the second part, and say that conventions emerge from whatever is there, but only conventions can individuate the bits of what is there. |
| 14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: In a 'modally plenitudinous' ontology, wherever there is an object at all, there are objects with intrinsic modal properties instantiating every consistent modal profile. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.5) | |
| A reaction: [She cites K.Bennett, Hawley, Rea, Sidelle] I love this. At last a label for the view I have been espousing. I am a Modal Plenitudinist. I must get a badge made. |
| 14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: An objection to the idea that statues are not identical to material lumps of stuff is the proliferation of instances of properties shared by those objects. If the mass of the statue is 500kg, and the mass of the lump is 500kg, do we have 1000kg? | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; she cites Rea 1997 and Zimmerman 1995] To wriggle out of this we would have to understand 'object' rather differently, so that an independent mass is not intrinsic to it. I leave this as an exercise for the reader. |
| 14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The 'grounding problem' is that given all that the statue and the lump have in common, what could possibly ground their different modal properties? | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 04.4) | |
| A reaction: Their modal properties are, of course, different, because only one of them could survive squashing. Thomasson suggests their difference of sort, but I'm not sure what that means, separately from what they actually are. |
| 14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Identity claims are only well-formed and truth-evaluable if the terms flanking the statement are associated with a certain category of entity each is to refer to, which disambiguates the reference and identity-criteria. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03) | |
| A reaction: The first of her two criteria for identity. She is buying the full Wiggins package. |
| 14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Identity claims are only true if the entities referred to are of the same category, and meet the criteria of identity appropriate for things of that category. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03) | |
| A reaction: This may be a little too optimistic about having a set of clear-cut and reasonably objective categories to work with, but attempts at establishing metaphysical categories have not gone especially well. |
| 14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Modal Conventionalism has at least three theses: 1) modal truths are either analytic truths, or combine analytic and empirical truths, 2) modal properties are not intrinsic features of the world, 3) modal propositions depend on linguistic conventions. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.2) | |
| A reaction: [She cites Alan Sidelle 1989 for this view] I disagree mainly with number 2), since I take dispositions to be key intrinsic features of nature, and I interpret dispositions as modal properties. |
| 14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Showing how, reflectively, we can make sense of our unreflective common sense worldview is arguably one of the chief tasks of philosophy. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Maybe. The obvious problem is that when you look at weird and remote cultures like the Aztecs, what counts as 'common sense' might be a bit different. She is talking of ordinary objects, though, where her point is reasonable. |
| 14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It would be better to follow the stories told about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosophers. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 134) | |
| A reaction: At this point in history there is a blurring between autonomous decisions and what we now call free will, and also between fate and determinism, which we try to keep distinct. |
| 1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The best men have no belief in necessity (set up by some as mistress of all), but refer some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is irresponsible, and fortune is unstable, while our own will is free. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
| 14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference have problems in handling nonexistence claims | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a very sound reason for shifting from a direct causal baptism view to one in which the baptism takes place by a social consensus. So there is a consensus about 'unicorns', but obviously no baptism. See Evans's 'Madagascar' example. |
| 14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference face the 'qua problem' - that it may be radically indeterminate what the term refers to unless there is some very basic concept of what sort of thing is being referred to. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: She cites Dummett and Wiggins on this. There is an obvious problem that when I say 'look at that!' there are all sorts of conventions at work if my reference is to succeed. |
| 14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The analytic interrelations among elements of language become evident through redundancy. It is redundant to utter 'He bought a house and a building', since buying a house analytically entails that he bought a building. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.4) | |
| A reaction: This appears to concern necessary class membership. It is only linguistically redundant if the class membership is obvious. Houses are familiar, uranium samples are not. |
| 1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The greatest good in avoiding confusion of the soul is prudence [phronesis], on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
| 14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: What occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and it is to this that praise and blame are attached. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133) | |
| A reaction: I don't think this should be understand as an assertion of free will in the modern sense. The 'swerve' of the atoms just means that decisions can arise out of us - not that they are somehow outside of nature. |
| 14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
| A reaction: This is a fairly accurate observation. To fear not being in this life is a bit like fearing not being in Vancouver next Tuesday. It also involves the paradox of the present moment. E.g. Idea 1904. |
| 14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: He is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to come. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
| A reaction: Not very plausible, I'm afraid. It provides a good argument in favour of smoking, if the lung cancer is far in the future. Paralysing fear is daft, but some remote fears should be heeded. |
| 14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The same kind of practice produces a good life and a good death. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 126) | |
| A reaction: This is the kind of old fashioned observation which we would do well to hang on to. The ideal of dying well has vanished from our culture. |
| 14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial to us, but not every one is to be chosen, just as every pain is a bad thing, but not every one is such as to be always avoided. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 129) | |
| A reaction: This kind of sensible remark would be wholly endorsed by Bentham and Mill. This fits in with the excellent distinction between what is right and what is good. |
| 14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption, but rather the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131) | |
| A reaction: I don't really understand the aspiration to a 'calm mind'. No one likes stress, but total calmness sounds close to non-existence. The mean! There is no achievement without pain. |
| 1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily, and we recognise this as the first good. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
| A reaction: We might enquire what we would live for if our capacities for pleasure were surgically removed. Would we still experience intellectual curiosity, or an aspiration to some cold and remote goodness? |
| 14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It is better for a good decision not to turn out right in action than for a bad decision to turn out right because of chance. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 135) | |
| A reaction: This sounds right, and on the whole the law agrees. Notice that what we need is a 'good decision', and not just to 'mean well'. The well-meaning fool is wicked. I am opposed to consequentialism, and agree with this idea. |
| 14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It is not drinking bouts or enjoying boys and women or consuming fish which produces the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out reasons for every choice, and drives out opinions which produce turmoil of the soul. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
| A reaction: This more or less sums up what I would call the philosophical life. Spontaneity is good, and some pleasures are killed by excessive thought, but on the whole actions are always better if good reasons are found, and error brings chaos. |
| 1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the chief good, we do not mean debauchery, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion…. which requires sober contemplation. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear how lack of pain and confusion counts as pleasure. Also the concepts of debauchery held by the puritan and the sybarite are wildly different. |
| 14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: We are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
| A reaction: This Buddhist aspiration to eliminate desire has no appeal for me. It just sounds like a recipe for boredom, and an aversion to risk-taking. Start by asking what is best in life; it inevitably involves pleasure of some sort. Anyway, desire isn't painful. |
| 14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Prudence is the principle of the rational life and is the greatest good. That is why prudence is more valuable than philosophy, for prudence is the source of all the other virtues. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
| A reaction: ['prudence' will be Greek 'phronesis']The interest of this is that it is almost copied straight out of Aristotle's Ethics. Epicurus was an opponent of the Peripatetics, but greatly influenced by them. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |