Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Varieties of Causation' and 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2)
     A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
     A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts?
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1)
     A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
     Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5)
     A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another.
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
     Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242)
     A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
     Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
     A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.