Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori' and 'Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
     Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4
     A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On a friendly reading of Quine, there is nothing to make the difference between a table's being contingently plastic and its being essentially plastic.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 5)
     A reaction: This is, of course, the dreaded modern usage of 'essential' to just mean 'necessary' and nothing more. In my view, there may be a big problem with knowing whether a problem is necessary, but knowing whether it is essential is much easier.
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6)
     A reaction: There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
     Full Idea: The unfriendly response to Quine's objection to essentialism is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response is that behind that conflation is a real epistemological problem for essentialism.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Richard Cartwright 1968 for the friendly response. The epistemological question is how we can know the essentialness of an essence.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: If something is offered as a candidate necessary a posteriori truth, how could we show that it is necessary, in the face of the fact that it takes investigation to show that it is true, and so, in some sense, it might have turned out to be false?
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: This is the topic of his paper, which he compares with how we can know that essences are essential.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.