14 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set? | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1') | |
A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious? |
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity means that there are an infinity of distinguishable individuals, which is an empirical proposition. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §5) | |
A reaction: The Axiom sounds absurd, as a part of a logical system, but Ramsey ends up defending it. Logical tautologies, which seem to be obviously true, are rendered absurd if they don't refer to any objects, and some of them refer to infinities of objects. |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility asserted that to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [note: two functions are equivalent when the same arguments render them both true or both false]. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §2) | |
A reaction: Ramsey in the business of showing that this axiom from Russell and Whitehead is not needed. He says that the axiom seems to be needed for induction and for Dedekind cuts. Since the cuts rest on it, and it is weak, Ramsey says it must go. |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: In 'a = b' either 'a' and 'b' are names of the same thing, in which case the proposition says nothing, or of different things, in which case it is absurd. In neither case is it an assertion of a fact; it only asserts when a or b are descriptions. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: This is essentially Frege's problem with Hesperus and Phosphorus. How can identities be informative? So 2+2=4 is extensionally vacuous, but informative because they are different descriptions. |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Group A consists of contradictions which would occur in a logical or mathematical system, involving terms such as class or number. Group B contradictions are not purely logical, and contain some reference to thought, language or symbolism. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.171), quoted by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference 1 | |
A reaction: This has become the orthodox division of all paradoxes, but the division is challenged by Priest (Idea 13373). He suggests that we now realise (post-Tarski?) that language is more involved in logic and mathematics than we thought. |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The formalists neglected the content altogether and made mathematics meaningless, but the logicians neglected the form and made mathematics consist of any true generalisations; only by taking account of both sides can we obtain an adequate theory. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: He says mathematics is 'tautological generalizations'. It is a criticism of modern structuralism that it overemphasises form, and fails to pay attention to the meaning of the concepts which stand at the 'nodes' of the structure. |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The hopelessly inadequate formalist theory is, to some extent, the result of considering only the propositions of mathematics and neglecting the analysis of its concepts. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: You'll have to read Ramsey to see how this thought pans out, but it at least gives a pointer to how to go about addressing the question. |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I can but put the evidence before me, and let it act on my mind. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.202), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 70 'Deg' | |
A reaction: Potter calls this observation 'downbeat', but I am an enthusiastic fan. It is roughly my view of both concept formation and of knowledge. You soak up the world, and respond appropriately. The trick is in the selection of evidence to confront. |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2') | |
A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification. |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified. | |
From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated. |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137) | |
A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion. |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was 1) true, ii) certain, iii) obtained by a reliable process. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.258), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel' | |
A reaction: Not sure why it has to be 'certain' as well as 'true'. It seems that 'true' is objective, and 'certain' subjective. I think I know lots of things of which I am not fully certain. Reliabilism long preceded Alvin Goldman. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |