16 ideas
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: On a friendly reading of Quine, there is nothing to make the difference between a table's being contingently plastic and its being essentially plastic. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 5) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, the dreaded modern usage of 'essential' to just mean 'necessary' and nothing more. In my view, there may be a big problem with knowing whether a problem is necessary, but knowing whether it is essential is much easier. |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
Full Idea: On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6) | |
A reaction: There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'! |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
Full Idea: The unfriendly response to Quine's objection to essentialism is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response is that behind that conflation is a real epistemological problem for essentialism. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Richard Cartwright 1968 for the friendly response. The epistemological question is how we can know the essentialness of an essence. |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: If something is offered as a candidate necessary a posteriori truth, how could we show that it is necessary, in the face of the fact that it takes investigation to show that it is true, and so, in some sense, it might have turned out to be false? | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: This is the topic of his paper, which he compares with how we can know that essences are essential. |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true. |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief? |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Representations are in the head, but their content is not; in this sense, the mind isn't in the head any more than stories (i.e. story contents) are in books. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.6) | |
A reaction: This is the final consequence of Putnam's idea that meanings ain't in the head. Intentionality is an extraordinary bridge between the brain and the external world. The ontology of stories, and musical compositions, is one philosophy's deepest problems. |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Some tasks (playing the piano, speaking foreign languages, playing fast sports) are best performed when the agent is largely unconscious of the details. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Ch.4 n16) | |
A reaction: A significant point, but it supports the evolutionary view, which is that what matters is success, and consciousness will switch on or off, whichever promotes the activity best. |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The Representational Thesis of mind identifies the qualities of experience - qualia - with the properties objects are represented as having. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §3.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to challenge the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, of which I am very fond. Is 'looks beautiful' a property of an object? Is the feeling of anger a property of an object? Qualia are properties of brains? |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4) | |
A reaction: There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right. |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
Full Idea: On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions. |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The 'problem' of introspection evaporates once one understands that it is not a process in which one looks inward. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: I take it that when we introspect we look at the contents of thoughts, which are representations of the external world, on the whole. But surely only the connections of those contents with memories can be seen inwardly? |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: Presumably brain events bring the world into the mind, so the world must be mentioned in explaining the mind. Maybe 'externalism' sounds grand, but is stating the boringly obvious. Explanations of mind need no mention of external particulars. |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
Full Idea: My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol) | |
A reaction: The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |