48 ideas
20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The snares of grammar are the metaphysics of the people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: If you have this elitist view of metaphysics, then linguistic analysis is just a branch of anthropology. |
24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: This unconditional will to truth: what is it? Is it the will not to let oneself be deceived? Is it the will not to deceive? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §344) | |
A reaction: He is hunting for the evolutionary origin of the love of truth, in the needs of a community. In that sense, I would have thought it was just the pressure to get the facts right, because error is dangerous. Nice thought, though. |
20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We Germans are Hegelians insofar as we instinctively attribute a deeper sense and richer value to becoming and development than to what 'is'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §357) | |
A reaction: I always doubt Nietzsche's claims about 'we Germans' or 'we philosophers'. They say that, intellectually, everyone is either French or German, and my immediate response was to embrace being German. So becoming is where it's at. |
24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Necessity is supposed to be the cause of something coming to be: in truth it is often only an effect of what has come to be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §205) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an account of the traditional idea of destiny - which sees inevitability in some major event, which was previously unpredictable. |
20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The strength of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incorporated, in its character as a condition of life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §110) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the rather modern idea (in Foucault, perhaps) of knowledge as a central component of culture, rather than as an eternal revelation of facts. Note that he is talking about its 'strength', not its veracity or degree of support. |
20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The emergence of our sense impressions into our consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them externally, increased proportionally with the need to communicate them to others by means of signs. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: He says in the same section that such ideas (plus his thoughts on consciousness) are the essence of his 'Perspectivism'. In effect, knowledge is not an individual activity, but a team game |
20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for 'truth'; we 'know' [das Erkennen] (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species; and this 'utility' is ultimately also a mere belief. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: [Section §354 is fascinating!] An odd idea, that we can only have truth is we have an 'organ' for it. It seems plausible that the whole brain is a truth machine. This seems like pure pragmatism, with all its faults. Falsehoods can be useful. |
4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have fixed up a world for ourselves in which we can live, with bodies, lines, planes, causes, motion and form; without these articles of faith nobody would endure life. But that does not mean they have been proved. Life is no argument. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §121) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree. A lot of recent thought suggests that they are Hume's 'natural beliefs', like truth and induction, which simply can't be proved. 'Unprovable' does not mean 'incorrect', however. |
6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche recommends an extreme version of perspectivism in holding that a person's view of the world is a function of that person's life-affirming (Heraclitean) or life-denying (Parmenidean) personality. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Fogelin recommends Nehamas on this topic. I am not convinced Nietzsche takes such an individual view as is implied here. See Idea 4420, for example. This view is in tune with Charles Taylor's view that our values shape our understanding of our selves. |
24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I think today we are at least far removed from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing from our corner that one is permitted to have perspectives only from this corner. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §374) | |
A reaction: He goes on to speculate about the possibility of infinite perspectives, most of them unknowable to us. But Nietzsche was not a simple relativism. The obvious concept needed to accompany a many-perspectives view is consensus. |
20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We could think, feel, will and remember, and we could also 'act', and yet none of this would have to enter our consciousness. The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a mirror. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: He credits Leibniz with this line of thought. Nowadays the unconscious aspects of thought are a commonplace, not just from Freud, but from neuroscience. We have no idea how conscious other animals are. Nietzsche attributes consciousness to communication. |
20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I surmise that consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; ...consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: An interesting speculation, well ahead of its time. Given that thought does not require consciousness, as he claims, it is not quite clear why communication needs it. Presumably two robots can communicate. But Idea 20118 is good. |
20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Chicken-and-egg question here. Persinally I take consciousnes to be associated with meta-thought, which bestows huge power, and I take language to arise from meta-thought. |
20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: By far the greatest proportion of our life takes place without this mirroring effect [of consciousness]; and this is true even of our thinking, feeling and willing life, however offensive this may sound to older philosophers. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche didn't just hint at the possibility of a (Freudian) sub-conscious - he was whole-heartedly committed to it, and Freud gave him credit for it. I think philosophers are only just beginning to digest this crucial idea. |
20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalisation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche would have made a great speech writer for someone. This vision is increasingly how I see people. It is a view reinforced by modern neuroscience, which suggests that we greatly overestimate the conscious part of ourselves. |
2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: "Everybody is farthest away - from himself"; and the maxim "know thyself" addressed to human beings by a god, is almost malicious. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) | |
A reaction: Expressed with characteristcally Nietzschean brio, but I couldn't agree more, and it is a very important truth. You can only require full self-knowledge if the whole mind is available to be known, and that isn't even remotely the case. |
24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even one's thoughts one cannot reproduce entirely in words. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §244) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is the germ of Derrida, who seems to see little connection between thought and speech. I take this idea to be entirely correct. Our simplistic view of language reduces the fluidity and many dimensions of thought to a pile of lego bricks. |
24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only now is the truth dawning on us that the biggest part by far of our intellectual activity takes place unconsciously, and unfelt by us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §333) | |
A reaction: Note that this is 'intellectual activity', and just the hidden rumblings of instincts and emotions. I think he is right. Philosophers want to verbalise everything, but I don't think the main insights of philosophical thinking are verbal. |
2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) | |
A reaction: Nice question. It is perfectly plausible to say that I seem to feel guilty about doing something, but can't see any reason why I should. |
20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes the higher human being from the lower is that the former see and hear immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully - and precisely this distinguishes human beings from animals, and the higher animals from the lower. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §301) | |
A reaction: Since most people are well equipped with eyes and ears, I take it that this phenomenon, if true, arises from the 'higher' type of person having more interest in what they experience. |
24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whenever we encounter a morality we find an estimation and order of rank of human drives and actions. These are always the expression of the needs of a community and herd. The individual is valued only as a function of the herd. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §116) | |
A reaction: A particularly clear summary of Nietzsche's understanding of modern morality (which he rejects). I tend to see values as what is important, but Nietzsche sees them as a ranking. Could be both. I see the individualism here as existentialist. |
22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche was not simply a run-of-the-mill moral relativist. He branded as 'childish' the idea that no morality can be binding because moral valuations are necessarily different among different nations. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §345) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.146 | |
A reaction: Relativists about knowledge and morality are inclined to take quotations from Nietzsche out of context. The existence of this database probably exacerbates such intellectual wickedness. Get a feeling for the whole thinker! |
2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There neither are nor can be actions which are the same. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) |
20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Virtues like industriousness, obedience, chastity, filial piety and justice are usually harmful to those who possess them. When you have a real, whole virtue you are its victim. But your neighbour praises your virtue precisely on that account. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §021) | |
A reaction: This is the conspiracy theory of virtue. We want people to do menial or undesirable jobs, so we dress them up as wonderful virtues, and make people feel good for possessing them. There must be some truth in this. |
4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Pity and good cheer are complementary, ..so there is something contradictory in a philosophy that advocates joyful wisdom, while slandering pity as the enemy of the higher life. | |
From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882]) by Roger Scruton - Animal Rights and Wrongs p.35 | |
A reaction: A good objection to Nietzsche. He has a rather solipsistic view of joyful exuberance etc., and fails to realise how social such things must be. In that, Nietzsche was caught in the romantic tradition of Wordsworth and co. |
2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is selfish to experience one's own judgement as a universal law. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) |
24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One thing is essential - 'giving style' to one's character. It is practised by the one who surveys everything that his nature offers in strengths and weaknesses, and subjects it to an artistic plan until each thing appears as art and reason. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §290) | |
A reaction: Clearly existentialist, in its proposal to change one's own character. I invite the reader to consider applying this to themselves - and I submit that it is an impossible project. Nice thought, though. |
20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That what happens necessarily, spontaneously and without any purpose, may henceforth appear to be done for some purpose, and strike man as rational and an ultimate commandment, the ethical teacher comes on stage, as teacher of the purpose of existence. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §001) | |
A reaction: This doesn't look like much of a solution to the problem of nihilism, unless the teacher plants an idea in us which endures and grows. Nietzsche's 'eternal recurrence' was supposed to be just such an idea. |
9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §042) | |
A reaction: Ignoring 'vulgar', this is a nice thought. Do affluent retired people now travel so much because they are terrified of boredom? What would they end up doing if they stayed at home and lived through the boredom to something else? |
24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The secret of harvesting the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from existence is: live dangerously! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §283) | |
A reaction: I treasured this quotation when I was 17, but failed to live up to it. |
2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Suppose a demon were to say to you, "This life as you have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more". …Then the question in each thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie across your actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §341) | |
A reaction: If you were stuck in nihilistic indifference, this thought might not be enough to rouse you from your torpor. If all possibilities in life are boring, repetition cannot pep it up, or make it any worse. But I still love this idea! |
6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche is overwhelmingly concerned with how to respond to nihilism, and he offers the concept of eternal return; the Overman is one who can affirm over and over that one is equal to meaninglessness, without turning to despair or idols. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §342) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.192 | |
A reaction: I agree with Critchley that this is not much of a recipe for ordinary people's lives, and I don't even find it very congenial for a tough-minded philosopher. We should make the best of the cards we are dealt, however feeble they may appear. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Saying 'God is eternal' means either that God is non-temporal or timeless, or that God has no beginning and no end. The first ('classical') view is found in Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 8 'Meaning') | |
A reaction: A God who is outside of time but performs actions is a bit of a puzzle. It seems that Augustine started the idea of a timeless God. |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We may wonder whether God can be good since he has not produced more moral goodness than he has. We may wonder whether God is guilty by neglect. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: The orthodox response is that we cannot possibly know what the maximum of moral goodness would look like, so we can't make this judgement. Atheists say that God fails by human standards, which are not particularly high. |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If we can know that God exists and if God's goodness is not moral goodness, then moral goodness is not the highest form of goodness we know. There is the goodness of God to be reckoned with. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: This idea is to counter the charge that God fails to meet human standards for an ideal moral agent. But it sounds hand-wavy, since we presumably cannot comprehend the sort of goodness that is postulated here. |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We have good reason for resisting the suggestion that God has any duties or obligations. …What can oblige God in relation to his creatures? Could there be a law saying God has such obligations? Where does such a law come from? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: Plato can answer this question. Greek gods are not so supreme that nothing could put them under an obligation, but 'God' has to be supreme in every respect. |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: 'Natural theology' is the attempt to show that belief in God's existence can be defended with reference to reason or argument which ought to be acceptable to anyone, not simply to those who believe in God's existence. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 1 'Other') | |
A reaction: I assume by 'reason or argument' he primarily means evidence (plus the ontological argument). He cites Karl Barth as objecting to the assumption of natural theology (preferring revelation). Presumably Kierkegaard offers a rival view too. |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If the universe was caused to come into being, it presumably could not have been caused to do so by anything material. For a material object would be part of the universe, and we are now asking for a cause distinct from the universe. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 5 'God') | |
A reaction: We're out of our depth here. We only have two modes of existence to offer, material and spiritual, and 'spiritual' means little more than non-material. |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: The design argument offers two lines: the first states that the universe displays design in the sense of purpose; the second that it displays design in the sense of regularity. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'Versions') | |
A reaction: I would have thought that you would infer the purpose from the regularity. How could you see purpose in a totally chaotic universe? |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If God is an instance of something orderly, how can he serve to account for the order of orderly things? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'b Has') | |
A reaction: You can at least explain the tidiness of a house by the tidiness of its owner, but obviously that won't explain the phenomenon of tidiness. |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Might it not be possible that experience of God requires an unusual state or psychological abnormality, just as an aerial view of Paris requires that one be in the unusual state of being abnormally elevated? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Are the') | |
A reaction: That would make sense if it were analogous to great mathematical or musical ability, but it sounds more like ouija boards in darkened rooms. Talent has a wonderful output, but people in mystical states don't return with proofs. |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Maybe someone who believes in God can be regarded as experiencing everything as something behind which God lies. Believers see the world as a world in which God is present. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Experiencing') | |
A reaction: [Attributed to John Hick] This would count as supporting evidence for God, perhaps, if seeing reality as infused with God produces a consistent and plausible picture. But seeing reality as infused with other things might pass the same test. |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: A proclaimed experience of God must be rejected because a) there is no agreed test that it is such an experience, b) some people experience God's absence, and c) there is no uniformity of testimony about the experience. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Objections') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm not sure that absence of an experience is experience of an absence. Compare it with experiencing the greatness of Beethoven's Ninth. |
2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §125) |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: There are virtues (such as courage) that would not be present in a paradise. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Evil') | |
A reaction: Part of a suggestion that morality would be entirely inapplicable in paradise, and so we need dangers etc in the world. |