49 ideas
20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The snares of grammar are the metaphysics of the people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: If you have this elitist view of metaphysics, then linguistic analysis is just a branch of anthropology. |
24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: This unconditional will to truth: what is it? Is it the will not to let oneself be deceived? Is it the will not to deceive? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §344) | |
A reaction: He is hunting for the evolutionary origin of the love of truth, in the needs of a community. In that sense, I would have thought it was just the pressure to get the facts right, because error is dangerous. Nice thought, though. |
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: We negate predicates but do not negate names. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §88) | |
A reaction: This is a point for anyone like Ramsey who wants to collapse the distinction between particulars and universals, or singular terms and their predicates. |
20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We Germans are Hegelians insofar as we instinctively attribute a deeper sense and richer value to becoming and development than to what 'is'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §357) | |
A reaction: I always doubt Nietzsche's claims about 'we Germans' or 'we philosophers'. They say that, intellectually, everyone is either French or German, and my immediate response was to embrace being German. So becoming is where it's at. |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories are usually not assumed to be ordered by containment, but also be generality. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: I much prefer generality, which is responsive to the full picture, whereas containment seems to appeal too much to the orderly and formalised mind. Containments overlap, so we can't dream of a perfectly neat system. |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: How far down are we allowed to go before the categories become too special to qualify as ontological categories? | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, because we can't deny a category to a set with only one member, otherwise the last surviving dodo would not have been a dodo. |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: There is an idea that objects belonging to the same category have the same criteria of identity. This view was first explicitly endorsed by Frege (1884), and was later systematized by Dummett (1981). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: This approach is based on identity between equivalence classes. Westerhoff says it means, implausibly, that the resulting categories cannot share properties. |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My fundamental idea is that 'form-sets' are intersubstitutable constituents of states of affairs with the same form, and 'base-sets' are special form-sets which can be used to construct other form-sets. Ontological categories are the base-sets. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The spirit of this is, of course, to try to achieve the kind of rigour that is expected in contemporary professional philosophy, by aiming for some sort of axiom-system that is related to a well established precise discipline like set theory. Maybe. |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It is usually assumed of ontological categories that they can explain why certain substitutions make a statement false ('prime' for 'odd'), while others make it meaningless ('sweet' for 'odd', of numbers). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §05) | |
A reaction: So there is a strong link between big ontological questions, and Ryle's famous identification of the 'category mistake'. The phenomenon of the category mistake is undeniable, and should make us sympathetic to the idea of categories. |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Systems of ontological categories are systematizations of our intuitions about generality, intersubstitutability, and identity. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §23) | |
A reaction: I think we might be able to concede this without conceding the relativism about categories which Westerhoff espouses. I would claim that our 'intuitions' are pretty accurate about the joints of nature, and hence accurate about these criteria. |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories in terms of generality, dependence and containment are unsatisfactory because of the 'cut-off point problem': they don't give an account of how far down the order we can go and be sure we are still dealing with categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: I don't see why this should be a devastating objection to any theory. I have a very clear notion of a human being, but a very hazy notion of how far back towards its conception a human being extends. |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It seems to be one of the central points of constructing systems of ontological categories that everything can be placed in some category or other. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §49) | |
A reaction: After initial resistance to this, I suppose I have to give in. The phoenix (a unique mythological bird) is called a 'phoenix', though it might just be called 'John' (cf. God). If there were another phoenix, we would know how to categorise it. |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Surveyed ontological systems show overlaps: properties and relations turn up in every system; individuals form part of five systems; abstracta, collections/sets and events are in four; facts are in two. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: Westerhoff is a hero for doing such a useful survey. Of course, Quine challenges properties, and relations are commonly given a reductive analysis. Individuals can be challenged, and abstracta reduced. Sets are fictions. Events or facts? Etc. |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: I deny the absolutism of a unique system of ontological categories and the essentialist view of membership in ontological categories as necessary features. ...I regard ontological categories as similar to axioms of formalized theories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that modern axioms are not fundamental self-evident truths, but an economic set of basic statements from which some system can be derived. There may be no unique set of axioms for a formal system. |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that categories are relativistic, used for systematization, and that it is not an intrinsic feature of an object to belong to a category, and that there is no fundamental distinction between individuals and properties. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He calls his second conclusion 'anti-essentialist', but I think we can still get an account of (explanatory) essence while agreeing with his relativised view of categories. Wiggins might be his main opponent. |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: What ontological category a thing belongs to is not dependent on its inner nature, but dependent on what other things there are in the world, and this is a contingent matter. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §89) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at those, like Wiggins, who claim that category is essential to a thing, and there is no possible world in which that things could belong to another category. Sounds good, till you try to come up with examples. |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Essential kinds can be very specific, and arguably too specific for the purposes of ontological categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: Interesting. There doesn't seem to be any precise guideline as to how specific an essential kind might be. In scientific essentialism, each of the isotopes of tin has a distinct essence, but why should they not be categories |
24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Necessity is supposed to be the cause of something coming to be: in truth it is often only an effect of what has come to be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §205) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an account of the traditional idea of destiny - which sees inevitability in some major event, which was previously unpredictable. |
20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The strength of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incoporated, in its character as a condition of life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §110) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the rather modern idea (in Foucault, perhaps) of knowledge as a central component of culture, rather than as an eternal revelation of facts. Note that he is talking about its 'strength', not its veracity or degree of support. |
20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The emergence of our sense impressions into our consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them externally, increased proportionally with the need to communicate them to others by means of signs. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: He says in the same section that such ideas (plus his thoughts on consciousness) are the essence of his 'Perspectivism'. In effect, knowledge is not an individual activity, but a team game |
20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for 'truth'; we 'know' [das Erkennen] (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species; and this 'utility' is ultimately also a mere belief. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: [Section §354 is fascinating!] An odd idea, that we can only have truth is we have an 'organ' for it. It seems plausible that the whole brain is a truth machine. This seems like pure pragmatism, with all its faults. Falsehoods can be useful. |
4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have fixed up a world for ourselves in which we can live, with bodies, lines, planes, causes, motion and form; without these articles of faith nobody would endure life. But that does not mean they have been proved. Life is no argument. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §121) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree. A lot of recent thought suggests that they are Hume's 'natural beliefs', like truth and induction, which simply can't be proved. 'Unprovable' does not mean 'incorrect', however. |
6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche recommends an extreme version of perspectivism in holding that a person's view of the world is a function of that person's life-affirming (Heraclitean) or life-denying (Parmenidean) personality. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Fogelin recommends Nehamas on this topic. I am not convinced Nietzsche takes such an individual view as is implied here. See Idea 4420, for example. This view is in tune with Charles Taylor's view that our values shape our understanding of our selves. |
24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I think today we are at least far removed from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing from our corner that one is permitted to have perspectives only from this corner. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §374) | |
A reaction: He goes on to speculate about the possibility of infinite perspectives, most of them unknowable to us. But Nietzsche was not a simple relativism. The obvious concept needed to accompany a many-perspectives view is consensus. |
20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We could think, feel, will and remember, and we could also 'act', and yet none of this would have to enter our consciousness. The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a mirror. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: He credits Leibniz with this line of thought. Nowadays the unconscious aspects of thought are a commonplace, not just from Freud, but from neuroscience. We have no idea how conscious other animals are. Nietzsche attributes consciousness to communication. |
20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I surmise that consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; ...consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: An interesting speculation, well ahead of its time. Given that thought does not require consciousness, as he claims, it is not quite clear why communication needs it. Presumably two robots can communicate. But Idea 20118 is good. |
20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Chicken-and-egg question here. Persinally I take consciousnes to be associated with meta-thought, which bestows huge power, and I take language to arise from meta-thought. |
20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: By far the greatest proportion of our life takes place without this mirroring effect [of consciousness]; and this is true even of our thinking, feeling and willing life, however offensive this may sound to older philosophers. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche didn't just hint at the possibility of a (Freudian) sub-conscious - he was whole-heartedly committed to it, and Freud gave him credit for it. I think philosophers are only just beginning to digest this crucial idea. |
20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalisation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §354) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche would have made a great speech writer for someone. This vision is increasingly how I see people. It is a view reinforced by modern neuroscience, which suggests that we greatly overestimate the conscious part of ourselves. |
2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: "Everybody is farthest away - from himself"; and the maxim "know thyself" addressed to human beings by a god, is almost malicious. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) | |
A reaction: Expressed with characteristcally Nietzschean brio, but I couldn't agree more, and it is a very important truth. You can only require full self-knowledge if the whole mind is available to be known, and that isn't even remotely the case. |
24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even one's thoughts one cannot reproduce entirely in words. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §244) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is the germ of Derrida, who seems to see little connection between thought and speech. I take this idea to be entirely correct. Our simplistic view of language reduces the fluidity and many dimensions of thought to a pile of lego bricks. |
24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only now is the truth dawning on us that the biggest part by far of our intellectual activity takes place unconsciously, and unfelt by us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §333) | |
A reaction: Note that this is 'intellectual activity', and just the hidden rumblings of instincts and emotions. I think he is right. Philosophers want to verbalise everything, but I don't think the main insights of philosophical thinking are verbal. |
2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) | |
A reaction: Nice question. It is perfectly plausible to say that I seem to feel guilty about doing something, but can't see any reason why I should. |
20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes the higher human being from the lower is that the former see and hear immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully - and precisely this distinguishes human beings from animals, and the higher animals from the lower. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §301) | |
A reaction: Since most people are well equipped with eyes and ears, I take it that this phenomenon, if true, arises from the 'higher' type of person having more interest in what they experience. |
24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whenever we encounter a morality we find an estimation and order of rank of human drives and actions. These are always the expression of the needs of a community and herd. The individual is valued only as a function of the herd. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §116) | |
A reaction: A particularly clear summary of Nietzsche's understanding of modern morality (which he rejects). I tend to see values as what is important, but Nietzsche sees them as a ranking. Could be both. I see the individualism here as existentialist. |
22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche was not simply a run-of-the-mill moral relativist. He branded as 'childish' the idea that no morality can be binding because moral valuations are necessarily different among different nations. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §345) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.146 | |
A reaction: Relativists about knowledge and morality are inclined to take quotations from Nietzsche out of context. The existence of this database probably exacerbates such intellectual wickedness. Get a feeling for the whole thinker! |
2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There neither are nor can be actions which are the same. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) |
20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Virtues like industriousness, obedience, chastity, filial piety and justice are usually harmful to those who possess them. When you have a real, whole virtue you are its victim. But your neighbour praises your virtue precisely on that account. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §021) | |
A reaction: This is the conspiracy theory of virtue. We want people to do menial or undesirable jobs, so we dress them up as wonderful virtues, and make people feel good for possessing them. There must be some truth in this. |
4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Pity and good cheer are complementary, ..so there is something contradictory in a philosophy that advocates joyful wisdom, while slandering pity as the enemy of the higher life. | |
From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882]) by Roger Scruton - Animal Rights and Wrongs p.35 | |
A reaction: A good objection to Nietzsche. He has a rather solipsistic view of joyful exuberance etc., and fails to realise how social such things must be. In that, Nietzsche was caught in the romantic tradition of Wordsworth and co. |
2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is selfish to experience one's own judgement as a universal law. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335) |
24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One thing is essential - 'giving style' to one's character. It is practised by the one who surveys everything that his nature offers in strengths and weaknesses, and subjects it to an artistic plan until each thing appears as art and reason. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §290) | |
A reaction: Clearly existentialist, in its proposal to change one's own character. I invite the reader to consider applying this to themselves - and I submit that it is an impossible project. Nice thought, though. |
20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That what happens necessarily, spontaneously and without any purpose, may henceforth appear to be done for some purpose, and strike man as rational and an ultimate commandment, the ethical teacher comes on stage, as teacher of the purpose of existence. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §001) | |
A reaction: This doesn't look like much of a solution to the problem of nihilism, unless the teacher plants an idea in us which endures and grows. Nietzsche's 'eternal recurrence' was supposed to be just such an idea. |
9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §042) | |
A reaction: Ignoring 'vulgar', this is a nice thought. Do affluent retired people now travel so much because they are terrified of boredom? What would they end up doing if they stayed at home and lived through the boredom to something else? |
24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The secret of harvesting the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from existence is: live dangerously! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §283) | |
A reaction: I treasured this quotation when I was 17, but failed to live up to it. |
2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Suppose a demon were to say to you, "This life as you have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more". …Then the question in each thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie across your actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §341) | |
A reaction: If you were stuck in nihilistic indifference, this thought might not be enough to rouse you from your torpor. If all possibilities in life are boring, repetition cannot pep it up, or make it any worse. But I still love this idea! |
6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche is overwhelmingly concerned with how to respond to nihilism, and he offers the concept of eternal return; the Overman is one who can affirm over and over that one is equal to meaninglessness, without turning to despair or idols. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §342) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.192 | |
A reaction: I agree with Critchley that this is not much of a recipe for ordinary people's lives, and I don't even find it very congenial for a tough-minded philosopher. We should make the best of the cards we are dealt, however feeble they may appear. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §125) |