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7527
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Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
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Full Idea:
For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense.
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From:
report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
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A reaction:
A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality.
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7322
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Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
We should distinguish 'constitutive scepticism' (about the existence of certain sorts of facts) from the traditional 'epistemological scepticism' (which concedes that the sort of fact in question exists, but questions our right to claim knowledge of it).
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 4.7)
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A reaction:
I would be inclined to call the first type 'ontological scepticism'. Miller is discussing Quine's scepticism about meaning. Atheists fall into the first group, and agnostics into the second. An important, and nicely simple, distinction.
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7325
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Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Dispositional facts are facts about what we will do, not about what we ought to do, and as such cannot capture the normativity of meaning.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.2)
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A reaction:
Miller is discussing language, but this raises a nice question for all behaviourist accounts of mental events. Perhaps there is a disposition to behave in a guilty way if you do something you think you shouldn't do. (Er, isn't 'guilt' a mental event?)
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7324
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Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Grice wants to explain linguistic meaning in terms of the content of propositional attitudes, Dummett has championed the view that propositional attitudes must be explained by linguistic meaning, while Davidson says they must be explained together.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.1)
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A reaction:
A useful map. My intuition says propositional attitudes come first, for evolutionary reasons. We are animals first, and speakers second. Thought precedes language. A highly social animal flourishes if it can communicate.
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22302
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Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
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Full Idea:
Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.
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From:
report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'
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A reaction:
This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.
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7526
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Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
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Full Idea:
Moore rejected the Hegelian view, that a proposition is a unity that defies analysis; instead, it is a complex that positively cries out to be broken up into its constituent parts, which parts Moore called 'concepts'.
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From:
report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
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A reaction:
Russell was much influenced by this idea, though it may be found in Frege. Anglophone philosophers tend to side instantly with Moore, but the Hegel view must be pondered. An idea comes to us in a unified flash, before it is articulated.
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7328
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The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Properly construed, the principle of charity is a holistic constraint applying, not to individual beliefs, but rather to systems of belief: we must interpret a speaker so that most of the beliefs in his system are, by our lights, true.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 8.7)
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A reaction:
This is a lot more plausible than applying the principle to individual sentences, particularly if you are in the company of habitual ironists or constitutional liars.
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