Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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14 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
     A reaction: This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Conceptual possibilities are just (metaphysical) possibilities that we can conceive of.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Critics say there are no irreducible a posteriori truths. They can be factored into a part that is necessary, but knowable a priori through conceptual analysis, and a part knowable only a posteriori, but contingent. 2-D semantics makes this precise.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
     A reaction: [Critics are Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers] Interesting. If gold is necessarily atomic number 79, or it wouldn't be gold, that sounds like an analytic truth about gold. Discovering the 79 wasn't a discovery of a necessity. Stalnaker rejects this idea.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A 'centred' possible world is an ordered triple consisting of a possible world, an individual in the domain of that world, and a time.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
     From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
     A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
     Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
     From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
     A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
     From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
     A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Meanings ain't in the head. Putnam's famous slogan actually fits Frege's anti-psychologism better than it fits Purnam's and Burge's anti-individualism. The point is that intensions of any kind are abstract objects.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2)
     A reaction: If intensions are abstract, that leaves (for me) the question of what they are abstracted from. I take it that there are specific brain events that are being abstractly characterised. What do we call those?
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: In 'causal descriptivism' the causal story is built into the description that is the content of the name (and also incorporates a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions that names abbreviate have wide scope).
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 5)
     A reaction: Not very controversial, I would say, since virtually every fact about the world has a 'causal story' built into it. Must we insist on rigidity in order to have wide scope?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Two-dimensionalism says the necessity of a statement is constituted by the fact that the secondary intensions is a necessary proposition, and their a posteriori character is constituted by the fact that the associated primary intension is contingent.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2)
     A reaction: This view is found in Sidelle 1989, and then formalised by Jackson and Chalmers. I like metaphysical necessity, but I have some sympathy with the approach. The question must always be 'where does this necessity derive from'?
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: On the metasemantic interpretation of the two-dimensional framework, the second dimension is used to represent the metasemantic facts about the relation between a thinker or speaker and the contents of her thoughts or utterances.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 4)
     A reaction: I'm struggling to think what facts there might be about the relation between myself and the contents of my thoughts. I'm more or less constituted by my thoughts.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]
     Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics.
     From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232)
     A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.