29 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: I do not know any better way of showing what there is than looking at the assumptions needed to make sense of our normal talk. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
| A reaction: Davidson was a pupil of Quine. This I take to be the last flowering of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. The ontology we deduce from talk in a children's playground might be very bizarre, but we are unlikely to endorse it. 'Honest, it's true!' |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
| A reaction: He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous. |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Explanations typically relate statements, not events. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
| A reaction: An oddly linguistic way of putting our attempts to understand the world. Presumably the statements are supposed to be about the events (or whatever), and they are supposed to be true, so we are trying to relate features of the world. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2 | |
| A reaction: I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view. |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'. | |
| From: comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1 | |
| A reaction: Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine). |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite). | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3) | |
| A reaction: If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer? |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: For Davidson, what makes singular causal statements true is the existence of some regularities or laws. All causal is nomological: c causes e iff there is a law that connects events like c with events like e. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
| A reaction: I wonder if the cart is before the horse here. Scriven says this is just a claim that there are "phantom laws". It is the Humean view of causation, but surely the laws come after the causation, so can't be used to explain it? |
| 21181 | Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: General Relativity and quantum mechanics are the two great theories in physics today but they give two very different ideas for how forces work. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
| A reaction: Relativity says it is space curvature, and quantum theory says it is particle exchange? But is there a Relativity account of the strong nuclear force? |
| 21183 | Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: The Laws of Thermodynamics introduced the concepts of entropy and work; put simply, how much useful energy you can really get out of a steam engine. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
| A reaction: The point of science by this stage was to introduce measurable and quantifiable concepts |
| 21199 | Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: The muon, like all fermions, spins - and because a spinning electric charge generates a magnetic field all fermions act like tiny bar magnets. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 11) |
| 21191 | Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: The photon is actually a mix of two deeper things, the B and the W°, tied together by the Higgs mechanism. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
| A reaction: The B (for 'Boson') transmits a force associated with the 'winding symmetry'. (I record this without properly understanding it.) |
| 21189 | Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Quarks, leptons or bosons may actually be made up of something even smaller, bound together by a conjectural new force. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
| A reaction: Electrons are a type of lepton. Compare Idea 21180, from the same book. If electrons are not fundamental, what matters is not some 'stuff' they are made of, but a different force that would bind the ingredients. |
| 21180 | Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: As far as we can tell, electrons (and quarks) are fundamental. They are not small lumps of material, because we could always ask what the material is. The electron just ...is. They are collections of properties, with no apparent size. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
| A reaction: This idea from physics HAS to be of interest to philosophers! The bundle theory is discredited for normal objects and for minds, and so is the substrate idea for supporting properties. But rigorous physics accepts a bundle theory. |
| 21182 | Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Quantum mechanics is the only working description of the universe that we have. It is amazingly precise, and so far every experimental test has verified its predictions. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: I take it from this that quantum mechanics is simply TRUE. Get over it! It will never turn out to be wrong, but may be subsumed within some more fine-grained or extensive theory. |
| 21184 | Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Explaining the stable electron orbits would require a complete rewriting of the physics of subatomic particles. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
| A reaction: This really looks like a simple and major landmark moment. You can ignore a single anomaly, but not a central feature of your entire theory. |
| 21187 | Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: We can never measure these virtual (transitory) particles directly, and it turns out that they don't even have to obey the laws of physics. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
| A reaction: These seems to be the real significance of the Uncertainty Principle. Such particles 'borrow' huge amounts of energy for very short times. |
| 21185 | Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Colour charge is 'three-dimensional'. As well as the charge having a positive or negative sign, it can also have a direction, and for convenience these three different directions (pointing like a weather vane) are labelled 'red', 'green' and 'blue'. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
| 21194 | The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Gravity is not included in the Standard Model because we simply cannot study it using particles. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
| A reaction: I'm guessing that Einstein describes how gravity behaves, but not what it is. |
| 21195 | In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Supersymmetry suggest that the Standard Model becomes much simpler at high energies. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) |
| 21197 | Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: The forces in the Standard Model are built on gauge symmetries, with a one-dimensional charge (like electromagnetism), a two-dimensional charge (the weak force), and a three dimensional charge (the strong force). | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
| A reaction: See also Idea 21185. |
| 21188 | Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: For the weak force there must be a corresponding 'weak charge', and all the fermions, all the quarks and leptons carry it. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
| A reaction: So electrons carry a weak charge, as well as an electromagnetic charge. Like owning several passports. |
| 21186 | Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Inside a proton the quarks are rushing around like caged animals, free to move until they push against the bars to try to escape, when the gluons pull them back in. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
| 21192 | Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, which means they barely interact at all, but because the weak force is crucial in the decays of so many other particles, neutrinos are still produced in huge numbers. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 08) | |
| A reaction: They only interact with the W and Z bosons. |
| 21196 | To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: If all the forces are to combine, at some point they must all be the same strength, and Supersymmetry (SuSy) makes this happen. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like an impressive reason for favouring supersymmetry - as long as you have an a priori preference for everything combining. |
| 21190 | 'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: 'Space' in physics really just means location. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
| A reaction: Location can, of course, only be specified relative to something else. Space is really an abstraction, but at least it means there is some sort of background to locate all the fundamental fields. |
| 21193 | The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: The most precise surveys of the stars and galaxies tell us that the universe is made up of 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, and just 5% regular matter (the stuff of the Standard Model of particle physics). | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
| A reaction: Regular matter - that's me, that is. |
| 21198 | If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh] |
| Full Idea: If a theory has to rely on excessive 'fine-tuning', a series of extremely unlikely events in order to produce the universe we see around us, then it is extremely unlikely that this theory is correct. | |
| From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
| A reaction: He says the Standard Model has 26 parameters which are only known by experiment, rather than by theory. So instead of saying '...so there is a God', we should say '...so our theory isn't very good'. |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |