Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters to Johann Bernoulli' and 'talk'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals.
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
     Full Idea: If it were asserted that the Form of the Beautiful was itself beautiful, such a statement would require a prior understanding of the concept of beauty, so would immediately lead to an infinite regress, so the Forms can't be self-predicating.
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is a nice clear statement of the mess that Plato gets himself into if he wants the Forms to be self-predicating. Clearly the Form of the Beautiful can't be beautiful, but must be that which gives other things their beauty.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway]
     Full Idea: At what point does an object become 'whole'?
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This nice question strikes me as the central one in mereology. It is tempting to reply that the matter is entirely conventional, but there seems an obvious fact about something missing if one piece is absent from a jigsaw, or a cube is chipped.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway]
     Full Idea: If the Chinese Room is functionally equivalent to a Mandarin speaker, it ought to be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin (and it can't).
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Searle might triumphantly say that this proves there is no understanding in the room, but the objection won't go away, because the room is presumably functionally equivalent to a speaker, and not just a mere translator (who might use mechanical tricks).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.