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8460
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Philosophers have given precise senses to deduction, probability, computability etc [Quine/Ullian]
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Full Idea:
Successful explications (giving a precise sense to a term) have been found for the concepts of deduction, probability and computability, to name just three.
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From:
W Quine / J Ullian (The Web of Belief [1970], 65), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3
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A reaction:
Quine also cites the concept of an 'ordered pair'. Orenstein adds Tarski's definition of truth, Russell's definite descriptions, and the explication of existence in terms of quantifications. Cf. Idea 2958.
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5060
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All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
What (in the analysis of substances) exist ultimately are simple substances - namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general terms, 'monads', which are without parts.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §7)
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A reaction:
This seems to me to be atomistic panpsychism. He is opposed to physical atomism, because infinite divisibility seems obvious, but unity is claimed to be equally obvious in the world of the mental. Does this mean bricks are made of souls? Odd.
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5059
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Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5)
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A reaction:
Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes.
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