23 ideas
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: There is, in addition to the external world of physical objects and the internal world of ideas, a third realm of non-spatio-temporal objective objects, among which are thoughts. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This seems to be Platonism, and, in particular, to give a Platonic existent status to propositions. Personally I believe in propositions, but as glimpses of how our brains actually work, not as mystical objects. |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
Full Idea: It seems likely that the content of the word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327 (60)) | |
A reaction: This is the view I associate with Davidson, though fans of Axiomatic Truth give up defining it, and just describe how it behaves. Defining it is very elusive, but I don't accept that nothing can be said about the contents of the concept of truth. |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is essential that the reality shall be distinct from the idea. But then there can be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327 (60)) | |
A reaction: He thinks that logic can give a perfect account of truth, or at least the extension of truth, where ordinary language will always fail. I wonder what he would have thought of Tarski's theory? |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'I smell the scent of violets' has just the same content as 'It is true that I smell the scent of violets'. So it seems that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.328 (61)) | |
A reaction: This idea predates Ramsey's similar proposal, for which, oddly, Ramsey always seems to get the credit. To a logician they may have identical content, but pragmatically they are likely to differ in context. 'True' certainly doesn't add to the thought. |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
Full Idea: Thoughts are neither things in the external world nor ideas. A third realm must be recognised. Anything in this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the senses, and does not need an owner to belong with his consciousness. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.337(69)) | |
A reaction: This important idea is the creed for modern platonists. We don't have to accept Forms, or any particular content, but there is a mode of existence which is distinct from both mental and physical, and is the residence of 'abstracta'. I deny it! |
8228 | Being is revealed at the point between waking and sleep [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: At the point of sleep when sleep has not yet come and external wakefulness vanishes, at this point being is revealed. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 50) | |
A reaction: One for Heidegger. The problem with eastern philosophy is that no one expects that this revelation could be put into words, so we cannot compare our revelations of being, or pass them on to others. Which means they can't be criticised. |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
Full Idea: A fact is a thought that is true. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.342(74)) | |
A reaction: It strikes me as pretty obvious that facts are not thoughts, because they concern the contents of thoughts. You can't discuss facts without the notion of what a thought is 'about'. If I think about my garden, the relevant fact is aspects of my garden. |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Earlier, Frege divided objects into subjective, actual objective, and non-actual objective; in the 'Grundgesetze' he emphasised logical objects; but in 'The Thought' the non-actual objects become exclusively thoughts and their constituent senses. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.18 | |
A reaction: Sounds to me like Frege was finally waking up and taking a dose of common sense. The Equator is the standard example of a non-actual objective object. |
8232 | Neglect your self, and feel the consciousness of each other being [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Feel the consciousness of each person as your own consciousness. So, leaving aside concern for self, become each being. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 83) | |
A reaction: Good. The western scepticism about other minds puts up a barrier to this sort of thought. The best of Zen is when it encourages the use of imagination to explore what is real. But imagination struggles to distinguish what is true. |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
Full Idea: We distinguish the grasp of a thought, which is 'thinking', from the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, which is the act of 'judgement', from the manifestation of this judgement, which is an 'assertion'. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.329 (62)) |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: For Frege, thoughts belong to a special realm of reality, which he called the 'realm of sense' and distinguished from the 'realm of reference'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1 | |
A reaction: A thought is, for Frege, a proposition. There is a halfway Platonism possible here, where the 'realm' for such things exists, but within that realm the objects might be conventional, or some such. Real possible worlds containing fictions! |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: On Frege's view, what distinguishes thoughts from everything else is that they may meaningfully be called 'true' and 'false'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A lot of thinking is imagistic, and while the image may or may not truly picture the world, we tend to think that the truth or otherwise of daydreaming is simply irrelevant. Does Frege take all thought to be propositional? |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
Full Idea: When Dr Lauben thinks he has been wounded, ..only Dr Lauben can grasp thoughts determined in this way. But he cannot communicate a thought which only he can grasp. To say 'I have been wounded' he must use 'I' in a sense graspable by others. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 16.1 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems to be the first, and very influential, attempt to explain the unusual and revealing semantics of indexicals. It seems to be the ultimate source of 2-D semantics, by introducing two modes of meaning for one term. |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
Full Idea: I call a 'thought' something for which the question of truth can arise at all. ...So I can say: thoughts are senses of sentences, without wishing to assert that the sense of every sentence is a thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327-8 (61)) | |
A reaction: This builds on his distinction between sense and reference. The reference of every truth sentence is just 'the true', and the sense is the proposition. The concept of a proposition seems indispensable to logic, I would say. |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
Full Idea: Only a sentence with the time-specification filled out, a sentence complete in every respect, expresses a thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.343(76)) | |
A reaction: I take the 'every respect' to include the avoidance of ambiguity, and some sort of perspicacious reference for the terms. I wish philosophers would focus on the thoughts in their subject, and not nit-pick about the sentences. Does he mean 'utterances'? |
8230 | Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: Nice. You might train your own will like a dog in this way. It is a counterexample to the simplistic idea that all you need is a belief and a desire, and you have got an action. But (pace Searle, Ideas 3817 + 3818) this does not prove free will. |
8234 | Bondage and liberation are relative terms, which only frighten those already terrified of the universe [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Since in truth, bondage and freedom are relative, these words are only for those terrified with the universe. The universe is a reflection of minds. As you see many suns in water from one sun, so see bondage and liberation. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 110) | |
A reaction: Since most easterners have experienced permanent social repression, their philosophies all encourage them not to worry about it. No wonder marxism, proved popular, when it suggested you could actually change things. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
8231 | Abandon attachment to body, and feel the joy of being everywhere [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Toss attachment for body aside, realising I am everywhere. One who is everywhere is joyous. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 79) | |
A reaction: I really don't think it is wisdom to spend your time imagining things which are not true. I might imagine that some gorgeous film star is in love with me, but I don't recommend it. Live according to nature. We are physical beings. |
8227 | Feel your whole body saturated with cosmic essence [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Feel your substance, bones, flesh, blood, saturated with cosmic essence. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: I find this unsatisfactory. Being a sad victim of materialistic western scientific culture, I don't think 'cosmic essence' exists. I could imagine myself full of the stuff, and that might feel good, but I could also imagine I had won the lottery. |
8229 | The serenity in blue sky beyond clouds [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Simply by looking into blue sky beyond clouds - the serenity. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 59) | |
A reaction: Philip Larkin finds the same experience looking through high windows. If we articulate the experience, it seems to combine humility and detachment. The sky makes us insignificant, but the mind can project into the sky. |
8233 | Imagine fire burning up your whole body, but not you [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Focus on fire rising through your form from the toes up until the body burns to ashes, but not you. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 28) | |
A reaction: Try very hard to persuade yourself that you are immortal, even if you are not. Hm. Zen Buddhism actually contains very little commitment to what is true or false. It explores interesting beliefs like children playing with toys. Very post-modern. |