22014
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Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard]
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Full Idea:
Schulze said Reinhold and Kant violated their own theory with the thing-in-itself, and that Reinhold was wrong that all consciousnes is representational (since pain isn't), and the self can't represent itself without a regress.
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From:
report of Gottlob Schulze (Aenesidemus [1792]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
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A reaction:
[my compressed version] This article demolished Reinhold, which is a shame, because if he had responded constructively to these criticisms he might have reached be best theory of his age. These are analytic style objections, by counterexample.
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8790
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The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12)
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A reaction:
To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason.
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