11 ideas
| 22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
| 17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Objects do not by themselves naturally fall into countable units. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Hm. This seems to be modern Fregean orthodoxy. Why did the institution of counting ever get started if the things in the world didn't demand counting? Even birds are aware of the number of eggs in their nest (because they miss a stolen one). |
| 17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The fact that there is overlap does not seem to inhibit our ability to count squares. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: She has a diagram of three squares overlapping slightly at their corners. Contrary to Frege, these seems to depend on a subliminal concept of the square that doesn't depend on language. |
| 17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Why do speakers of English count carrots but not asparagus? There is no 'deep' reason. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997]) | |
| A reaction: Koslick is offering this to defend the Fregean conceptual view of counting, but what seems to matter is what is countable, and not whether we happen to count it. You don't need to know what carrots are to count them. Cooks count asparagus. |
| 17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The reason we have a hard time counting the branches and the waves is because our concepts 'branches on the tree' and 'waves on the ocean' do not determine sufficiently precise boundaries: the concepts do not draw a clear invisible line around each thing. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'isolation' referred to in Frege. |
| 17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Talk of snow concerns what stays the same when some snow changes, as it might be, from a heap of snow to a drift, to an expanse. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: The whiteness also stays the same, but isn't stuff. |
| 22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
| 22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
| 22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
| Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |