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3425
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Reduction has been defined as deriving one theory from another by logic and maths [Nagel,E, by Kim]
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Full Idea:
Ernest Nagel defines reduction as the possibility of deriving all laws of one theory by logic and mathematics to another theory, with appropriate 'bridging principles' (either definitions, or empirical laws) connecting the expressions of the two theories.
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From:
report of Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science [1961]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.213
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A reaction:
This has been labelled as 'weak' reduction, where 'strong' reduction would be identity, as when lightning is reduced to electrical discharge. You reduce x by showing that it is y in disguise.
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5495
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Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
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Full Idea:
In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
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From:
report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
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A reaction:
This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
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