24 ideas
23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Predicativists doubt the existence of sets with no predicative definition. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 02.3) | |
A reaction: This would imply that sets which encounter paradoxes when they try to be predicative do not therefore exist. Surely you can have a set of random objects which don't fall under a single predicate? |
23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The iterative conception justifies Power Set, but cannot justify a satisfactory theory of von Neumann ordinals, so ZFC appropriates Replacement from NBG set theory. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9) | |
A reaction: The modern approach to axioms, where we want to prove something so we just add an axiom that does the job. |
23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The limitation of size conception of sets justifies the axiom of Replacement, but cannot justify Power Set, so NBG set theory appropriates the Power Set axiom from ZFC. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9) | |
A reaction: Which suggests that the Power Set axiom is not as indispensable as it at first appears to be. |
23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The sentence connective 'and' also has an order-sensitive meaning, when it means something like 'and then'. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This is support the idea that orders are a feature of reality, just as much as possible concatenation. Relational predicates, he says, refer to series rather than to individuals. Nice point. |
23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The reason the two predicates 'before' and 'after' are needed is not to express different relations, but to indicate its order. Since there can be difference of order without difference of relation, the nature of relations is not the source of order. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.3) | |
A reaction: This point is to refute Russell's 1903 claim that order arises from the nature of relations. Hossack claims that it is ordered series which are basic. I'm inclined to agree with him. |
23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The transfinite ordinal numbers are important in the theory of proofs, and essential in the theory of recursive functions and computability. Mathematics would be incomplete without them. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.1) | |
A reaction: Hossack offers this as proof that the numbers are not human conceptual creations, but must exist beyond the range of our intellects. Hm. |
23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
Full Idea: I propose that numbers are properties, not sets. Magnitudes are a kind of property, and numbers are magnitudes. …Natural numbers are properties of pluralities, positive reals of continua, and ordinals of series. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro) | |
A reaction: Interesting! Since time can have a magnitude (three weeks) just as liquids can (three litres), it is not clear that there is a single natural property we can label 'magnitude'. Anything we can manage to measure has a magnitude. |
23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Numbers cannot be mental objects constructed by our own minds: there exists at most a potential infinity of mental constructions, whereas the axioms of mathematics require an actual infinity of numbers. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro 2) | |
A reaction: Doubt this, but don't know enough to refute it. Actual infinities were a fairly late addition to maths, I think. I would think treating fictional complete infinities as real would be sufficient for the job. Like journeys which include imagined roads. |
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
Full Idea: A concept of the understanding, which contains the general rule, must be supplemented by an act of judgement whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it does not. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's phronesis, and Hart's 'rules of recognition' in law courts. So is the link between theory and practice an intellectual one, or a sort of inarticulate intuition? I like 'common sense' for this ability. |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
Full Idea: My conception of duty does not need to be based on any particular end, but rather itself occasions a new end for the human will, that of striving with all one's power towards the highest good possible on earth, the universal happiness of the whole world. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1B) | |
A reaction: I see nothing in the categorical imperative that demands 'all one's power', and nothing that specifies happiness as what has to be universalised. Nietzsche, for one, thinks happiness is overrated. |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
Full Idea: It would not be a duty to strive after a certain effect of our will if this effect were impossible in experience. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
A reaction: 'Ought implies can' has become a familiar slogan. The quickest way to get shot of a tiresome duty is to persuade yourself that it is impossible. The seemingly impossible is occasionally achieved. |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
Full Idea: The will must have motives. But these are not objects of physical feeling as predetermined ends in themselves. They are none other than the absolute law itself, and the will's receptivity to it as an absolute compulsion is known as moral feeling. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1Bb) | |
A reaction: This sounds like our natural motivation to get the right answer when doing arithmetic, which is the innate motivation towards truth. I once heard it said that truth is the only value. So why does Donald Trump fail to value truth? |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing which commands immediate respect through reason, such as the basic rights of man, no influence can prevail upon man's arbitrary will and restrain his freedom. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: I think this is the nearest Kant gets to natural rights. It is hard to see how basic rights can be identified by pure reason, without some inbuilt human values. Kant's usual move is to say denial of them leads to a contradiction, but I'm going off that. |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
Full Idea: In all social contracts, we find a union of many individuals for some common end which they all share. But a union as an end in itself which they all ought to share …is only found in a society insofar as it constitutes a civil state i.e. a commonwealth. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
A reaction: This makes a nice link between the contractarian individual morality of Hobbes and his social contract view of society. Kant seems to reject the first but accept the second. Presumably because the first implies benefit and the second implies duty. |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
Full Idea: The actual principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract, and this itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
A reaction: This is the contract which combines a social contract with democracy. We unanimously agree not to be unanimous? Cf Idea 21065. What should the minority do when the majority elect criminal Nazi leaders? |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
Full Idea: The original contract …is merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: The contractualist theory of morality of Thomas Scanlon approaches this. Note that Kant says it 'can' oblige the legislators. Nothing would compel them to follow such a principle. |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it …it is unjust. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: Kant is explicitly trying to approximate Rousseau's general will. The categorical imperative was greatly influenced by Rousseau. The key point is not whether they accept it, but that unanimous acceptance is unthinkable. Unfair laws will fail. |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
Full Idea: The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master, and must have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
A reaction: Of course! Being one's own master evidently allows for being an employee, as long as this is a free contract, and not exploitation. Invites lots of interesting test cases. We need a Marxist commentary on this idea. |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
Full Idea: The civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following a priori principles. 1) the freedom of every member as a human being, 2) the equality of each as a subject, 3) the independence of each as a subject. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
A reaction: Written in 1792, three years after the start of the French Revolution. He says that a state with an inbuilt hierarchy or aristocracy is unlawful. Which freedoms, equality in what respects, and independence from what? |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
Full Idea: Every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
A reaction: This is equality of opportunity, which is a mantra for liberals, but has been subjected to good criticisms in modern times. The main question is whether there is formal and legal equality, or actual practical equality. |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
Full Idea: No one can voluntarily renounce his rights by a contract ..to the effect that he has no rights but only duties, for such a contract would deprive him of the right to make a contract, and would thus invalidate the one he had already made. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
A reaction: Kant tries to establish all of his principles by showing that their denial is contradictory. But this example is blatantly wrong. King Lear didn't nullify his previous legislation when he abdicated, and his two daughters legally kept their territories. |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
Full Idea: Each state must be organised so that the head of state, for whom the war costs nothing (for he wages it at the expense of the people) must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 3) | |
A reaction: I would guess that he has Louis XIV particularly in mind. Imagine if Kant's proposal had been implemented in 1914. A referendum takes ages, and the people would need the facts (from the intelligence agencies). |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |