55 ideas
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
Full Idea: Inference is never a conscious process. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 11.2) |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
Full Idea: Reasoning could be treated as a functionally defined process that is partly defined in terms of its role in giving a person knowledge. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.6) |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
Full Idea: If a rational man believes he has at least some other false beliefs, it follows that a rational man knows that at least one of his beliefs is false (the one believed false, or this new belief). | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 7.2) |
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor has an epistemological version, which says we should not multiply existences or explanations without adequate reason, and an ontological version, which says reality is simple, and so a simpler ontology represents it more accurately. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. Is it reality which is simple, or us? One shouldn't write off the ontological version. If one explanation is simpler than the others, there may be a reason in nature for that. |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
Full Idea: Any two states of affairs are logically connected, simply because both are entailed by their conjunction. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 8.1) |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
Full Idea: Deductive logic is the only logic there is. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
Full Idea: We may say "From P and If-P-then-Q, infer Q" (modus ponens), but there is no rule of acceptance to say that we should accept Q. Maybe we should stop believing P or If-P-then-Q rather than believe Q. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.1) |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
Full Idea: The underlying truth-conditional structures of thoughts are language-dependent in the sense that underlying predicates represent words in the language rather than universal concepts common to all languages. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.3) |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
Full Idea: The logical form of a sentence is that part of its structure that involves logical elements. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
Full Idea: Some sort of theory of logical form is involved in any theory of truth for a natural language. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A theory of existence should 1) be consistent with what actually exists, 2) be consistent with what could exist, 3) not make existence impossible (e.g. in space-time), 4) not violate logic, 5) make knowing the theory possible. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A nice bit of metaphilosophical analysis. I still doubt whether a theory of existence is possible (something has to be 'given' a priori), but this is a good place to start the attempt. |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Tropes are (says Campbell) substances (in Hume's sense), and indeed resemble his impressions conceived realistically rather than idealistically. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting link. It doesn't get rid of the problem Hume has, of saying when two impressions are the same. Are they types or tokens? Trope-theory claims they are tokens. Hume's ontology includes 'resemblance'. |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A property-instance must be spread out in space, or it is not clear how a colour nature can be present, but then it has to be a complex entity, and tropes are supposed to be simple entities. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Seems a fair point. Nothing else in reality can be sharply distinguished, so why should 'simple' and 'complex'? |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a decorator says that they used four colours to decorate a house, four tropes is not what was meant, and the statement seems to view colours as universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Although I am suspicious of using language to deduce ontology, you have to explain why certain statements (like this) are even possible to make. |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If properties are universals, what account can be given of the individuation of two entities that have all their pure properties in common? | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Is this a big problem? Maybe only a space-time location can do it. Or, in the nice case where the universe is just two identical spheres, it may be impossible. |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
Full Idea: One version of realism says that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances, and thus is a One-Over-Many. One version of this is the model/copy view, but this is not widely held, because of difficulties such as the Third Man Argument. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This presumably arises if the model is held to have the properties of the copy (self-predication), and looks like a bad theory |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Traditional realism is the view that a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it seems hard to commit oneself fully to realism. How can two red buses contain one abstract object spread out between them. Common sense says there are two 'rednesses' which resemble one another, which is a version of nominalism. |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Those who believe in universals appeal to the meaningfulness of language, the lawlike nature of causation, the inter-subjectivity of thinking, our ability to classify new entities, gradation, and the need for perfect standards or paradigms. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Of these, language and communication ought to be explicable by convention, but classification and natural laws look to me like the best evidence. |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Historically the problem of universals has mainly been about the "One over Many", which involves giving an account of the unity of natural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This still strikes me as the main problem (rather than issues of language). If universals are not natural, they must be analysed as properties, which break down into causation, which is seen as a human convention. |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Another version of realism says is One-In-Many, where the universal is not another particular, but is literally in the instances. The universal is an abstract entity, in the instances by means of a primitive non-spatiotemporal tie of predication. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Aristotle (and is Loux's view of properties and relations). If they are abstract, why must they be confined to particulars? |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Many properties (being even) and relations (musical intervals, being a father) are such that it is not clear what it would mean to take them as natural things existing in space. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: 'Being even' certainly seems to be a property, and it is a struggle to see how it could exist in space, unless it is a set of actual or potential brain states. |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue'). | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though. |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a property is held to be at the location of the particular, then if there are two objects having the same property, and one object is stationary and the other is moving, the realist is forced to say that the universal is both moving and at rest. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The target of this comment is D.M.Armstrong. The example nicely illustrates the problem of trying to combine science and metaphysics. It pushes you back to Platonism, but that seems wrong too… |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
Full Idea: When one attends to something existing in space, one attends to an instance of redness, not to redness itself (which is a colour, which resembles orange). The facts about red itself are not spatial facts, but are traditionally seen as a priori synthetic. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the fact that properties can themselves have properties (and so on?), which seems to take us further and further from the natural world. |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Four arguments for Platonism: 1) there are truths about redness (it's a colour) even if nothing red exists, 2) redness does not depend on particulars, 3) most universals are at some time not exemplified, 4) universals satisfy the criteria of existence. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This adds up to quite a good case, particularly the point that things can be said about redness which are independent of any particular, but the relationships between concepts and the brain seems at the heart of the problem. |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is going to be quite a struggle to make sense of 'exists' here (Russell tries 'subsists). Presumably each property must be a particular? |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism is clearly superior to Class Nominalism, since the former offers a clear ground for distinguishing between natural and unnatural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Important. It seems evident to me that there are natural classes, and the only ground for this claim would be either the resemblance or the identity of properties. |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Linguistic predicates are neither sufficient nor necessary for specifying a property. Predicates can be contrived which express no property, properties are far more numerous than linguistic predicates, and properties are what make predicates apply. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to me conclusive, and is a crucial argument against anyone who thinks that our metaphysics can simply be inferred from our language. |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Some argue that compared to sets, the identity conditions for properties are obscure, and so properties, including realist depictions of them, should be rejected. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I have never thought that difficulty in precisely identifying something was a good reason for denying its existence. Consider low morale in a work force. 2nd thoughts: I like this! |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to the generally accepted 'indiscernibility of identicals'. 'Discernment' is an epistemological concept, and 'identity' is an ontological concept. |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
Full Idea: Since inference is inference to the best total account, all your prior beliefs are relevant and your conclusion is everything you believe at the end. So, you constantly reaffirm your beliefs in inference. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 12.1) |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
Full Idea: That 'cats are animals' is often cited as an analytic truth. But (as Putnam points out) the inability to imagine this false is just a lack of imagination. They might turn out to be radio-controlled plastic spies from Mars. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.7) |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
Full Idea: Analyticity is postulated to explain why we cannot imagine certain things being true. A better postulate is that we are not good at imagining things. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.7) |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
Full Idea: I favour the inferential view of memory over the preservation view. …One constantly reinfers old beliefs. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 12.1) | |
A reaction: This has a grain of truth, but seems a distortion. An image of the old home floats into my mind when I am thinking about something utterly unconnected. When we search memory we may be inferring and explaining, but the same applies to searching images. |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
Full Idea: The reasons for which people believe things are rarely conscious. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Probably correct. The interesting bit is when they bring the beliefs into consciousness and scrutinise them rationally. Philosophers routinely overthrow their natural beliefs in this way. |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
Full Idea: There is no distinction between what we accept as evidence and whatever else we accept. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: According to Harman's negative coherence theory it is always permissible to adopt a new belief - any new belief; because beliefs are prima facie justified you do not need a reason for adopting a new belief. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §3.4.1 | |
A reaction: This must be placed alongside the fact that we don't usually choose our beliefs, but simply find ourselves believing because of the causal impact of evidence. This gives an unstated rational justification for any belief - something caused it. |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
Full Idea: Scepticism is undermined once it is seen that the relevant kind of justification is not a matter of derivation from basic principles but is rather a matter of showing that a view fits in well with other things we believe. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) | |
A reaction: I would (now) call myself a 'coherentist' about justification, and I agree with this. Coherent justification could not possibly deliver certainty, so it must be combined with fallibilism. |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
Full Idea: Induction is an attempt to increase the explanatory coherence of our view, making it more complete, less ad hoc, more plausible. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.2) |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If something is 'abstract' it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some (but not all) of what is presented. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably it usually involves picking out the behavioural or causal features, and leaving out the physical features - though I suppose it works for physical properties too… |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
Full Idea: Our conception of ourselves in the world is more like a map than a story. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], Pref) | |
A reaction: Dennett offer the 'story' view of the self (Ideas 7381 and 7382). How do we arbitrate this one? A story IS a sort of map. Maps can extend over time as well over space. I think the self is real, and is a location on a map, and the hero of a story. |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
Full Idea: There is no noncircular way to specify dispositions; for they are dispositions to behave given certain situations, and the situations must be include beliefs about the situation, and desires concerning it. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This is nowadays accepted dogmatically as the biggest objection to behaviourism, but it could be challenged. Your analysis may begin by mentioning beliefs and desires, but if you keep going they may eventually fade out of the picture. |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
Full Idea: If the right pattern of electrical discharges occurred in a cloud instead of in a brain, would that also be a headache? | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.2) | |
A reaction: The standard objection to functionalism is to propose absurd implementations of a mind, but probably only a brain could produce the right electro-chemical combination. |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
Full Idea: The theory of language-independent meanings or semantic representations is mistaken. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.5) | |
A reaction: This would make him (in Dummett's terms) a 'philosopher of language' rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Personally I disagree. Don't animals have 'meanings'? Can two sentences share a meaning? |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: For example, Davidson on truth. There is an onus to demonstrate why all attempted analyses fail. |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
Full Idea: The various theories are not in competition. The theory of truth is part of the theory of representational character, which is presupposed by the theory of communication, which in turn is contained in the more general theory of speech acts. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Certainly it seems that the supposed major contenders for a theory of meaning are just as much complements as they are competitors. |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
Full Idea: The only sort of sameness of meaning we know is similarity in meaning, not exact sameness of meaning. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.8) | |
A reaction: The Eiffel Tower and le tour Eiffel? If you want to be difficult, you can doubt whether the word 'fast' ever has exactly the same meaning in two separate usages of the word. |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
Full Idea: Ambiguity results from the possibility of transforming different underlying truth-conditional structures into the same surface form. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Personally I would call a 'truth-conditional structure' a 'proposition', and leave it to the philosophers to decide what a proposition is. |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
Full Idea: A theory of truth for a language shows how the truth conditions of any sentence depend on the structure of that sentence. The theory will say, for each element of structure, what its contribution is. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This just seems to push the problem of truth back a stage, as you need to know where the truth is to be found in the elements from which the structure is built. |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
Full Idea: 'Bob and John play golf' and 'John and Bob play golf' are equivalent; but if they were to be derived from the same underlying structure, one or the other of Bob and John would have to come first; and either possibility is arbitrary. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.4) | |
A reaction: If I watch Bob and John play golf, neither of them 'comes first'. A proposition about them need not involve 'coming first'. Only if you insist on formulating a sentence must you decide on that. |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
Full Idea: No purpose is served by thinking that certain principles available to a person are contained in his internal encyclopaedia - and therefore only synthetic - whereas other principles are part of his internal dictionary - and are therefore analytic. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.5) | |
A reaction: If it led to two different ways to acquire knowledge, then quite a lot of purpose would be served. He speaks like a pragmatist. The question is whether some statements just are true because of some feature of meaning. Why not? |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
Full Idea: There are many predicates of a given language that resist translation into another language, …so it is unlikely that there is a basic set of underlying structures common to all languages. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Not convincing. 'Structures' are not the same as 'predicates'. Once a language has mapped its predicates, that blocks the intrusions of differently sliced alien predicates. No gaps. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
Full Idea: 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: And Greek scepticism doubted even the present, since there is no space between past and future. It is a delightfully vertigo-inducing idea. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |