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19413
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If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The more perfect one is, the more one is determined to the good, and so is more free at the same time. ...Our power and knowledge are more extended, and our will much the more limited within the bounds of perfect reason.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Pierre Bayle [1702], 1702)
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A reaction:
I like this idea, which seems to me to derive from Aquinas. When I choose to eat and drink each day, or agree that 7+5 is 12, I don't complain about my lack of freedom in the choices. Goodness and reason are constraints I welcome.
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21929
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Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
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Full Idea:
Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
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From:
Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
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A reaction:
The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?
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