8210
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Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
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Full Idea:
To 'deconstruct' philosophy would be to think the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time determine what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into history by this motivated repression.
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From:
Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.5)
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A reaction:
All of this type of philosophy is motivated by what I think of as (I'm afraid!) a rather adolescent belief that we are all being 'repressed', and that somehow, if we think hard enough, we can all become 'free', and then everything will be fine.
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8211
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The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
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Full Idea:
The movement of 'différance', as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture etc.
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From:
Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.7)
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A reaction:
'Différance' is a word coined by Derrida, and his most famous concept. At first glance, the concept of a thing which is the source of all differentiation sounds like a fiction.
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5504
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Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
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Full Idea:
Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
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From:
R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
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A reaction:
At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.
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5505
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For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
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Full Idea:
In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
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From:
R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
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A reaction:
It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.
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