Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Events as property exemplifications' and 'Ontological Relativity'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
     Full Idea: Ontology is meaningless for a theory whose only quantification is substitutionally construed.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.64), quoted by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 03.5.1 n18
     A reaction: Hofweber views it as none the worse for that, since clearly lots of quantification has no ontological commitment at all. But he says it is rightly called 'a nominalists attempt at a free lunch'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
     Full Idea: What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but circularity. A question of the form "What is an F?" can only be answered with "An F is a G", which makes sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of G.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.53)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
     A reaction: I don't actually buy the idea that an event could just be an 'exemplification'. Change seems to be required, and processes, or something like them, must be mentioned. Degrees of fine-graining sound good, though, for processes too.
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: If Kim's events are just the ordered triple of is that such things are standardly conceived as abstract entities, usually sets, whereas events are concretely located in space and time.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: You might reply that the object, and maybe the attribute, are concrete, and the time is natural, but the combination really is an abstraction, even though it is located (like the equator). Where is the set of my books located?
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
     Full Idea: Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of , since many such triples do not yield events, such as . Kim has to specify that the object actually has that property at that time.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property?
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
     Full Idea: Kim's events are exemplifications by an object of an attribute at a time...It does not make events basic entities, as the three constituents are more basic, but it gives identity conditions (two events are the same if object, attribute and time the same).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: [Aristotle is said to be behind this] I am more sympathetic to this view than the claim that events are primitive. If a pebble is ellipsoid for a million years, is that an event? I think the concept of a 'process' is the most fruitful one to investigate.
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: Since some tautologously universal properties such as self-identity or being such that 2+2=4 apply to all things at all times, that is stretching Kim's events too far. Candidate properties need to be realistically restricted, and it is unclear how.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: You could deploy Schoemaker's concept of natural properties in terms of the source of causal powers, but the problem would be that you were probably hoping to then use Kim's events to define causation. Answer: treat causation as the primitive.
Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: The criticism most frequently levelled against Kim's theory is that it results in an unacceptable plurality of finely differentiated events, because of the requirement for identity of the constituent property.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 4.4
     A reaction: This may mean that the Battle of Waterloo was several trillion events, which seems daft to the historian, but it doesn't to the physicist. A cannon firing is indeed an accumulation of lots of little events.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
     Full Idea: Ontology is doubly relative. Specifying the universe of a theory makes sense only relative to some background theory, and only relative to some choice of a manual of translation of one theory into another.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.54)
     A reaction: People tend to forget about the double nature of Quine's notion of ontological commitment, and usually only talk about the commitment of the theory being employed. Why is the philosophical community not devoting itself to the study of tranlation manuals?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
     Full Idea: We cannot know what something is without knowing how it is marked off from other things. Identity is thus of a piece with ontology.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.55)
     A reaction: Actually it is failure of identity which seems to raise questions of individuation. If I say 'this apple is [pause] identical to this apple', I don't see how that helps me to individuate apples.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
     Full Idea: Relativity has two components: to the choice of a background theory, and to the choice of how to translate the object theory into the background theory.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.67)
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
     Full Idea: For Quine, we cannot sensibly ask which is the real number five, the Frege-Russell set or the Von Neumann one. There is no arithmetical or empirical way of deciding between the two. Reference is inscrutable.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3
     A reaction: To generalise from a problem of reference in the highly abstract world of arithmetic, and say that all reference is inscrutable, strikes me as implausible.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
     Full Idea: The indeterminacy between 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' and the rest depended only on a correlative indeterminacy of translation of the English apparatus of individuation - pronouns, plurals, identity, numerals and so on.
     From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.35)
     A reaction: This spells out the problem a little better than in 'Word and Object'. I just don't believe these problems are intractable. Quine is like a child endlessly asking 'why?'.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.