36 ideas
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: We negate predicates but do not negate names. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §88) | |
A reaction: This is a point for anyone like Ramsey who wants to collapse the distinction between particulars and universals, or singular terms and their predicates. |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: How far down are we allowed to go before the categories become too special to qualify as ontological categories? | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, because we can't deny a category to a set with only one member, otherwise the last surviving dodo would not have been a dodo. |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: There is an idea that objects belonging to the same category have the same criteria of identity. This view was first explicitly endorsed by Frege (1884), and was later systematized by Dummett (1981). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: This approach is based on identity between equivalence classes. Westerhoff says it means, implausibly, that the resulting categories cannot share properties. |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My fundamental idea is that 'form-sets' are intersubstitutable constituents of states of affairs with the same form, and 'base-sets' are special form-sets which can be used to construct other form-sets. Ontological categories are the base-sets. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The spirit of this is, of course, to try to achieve the kind of rigour that is expected in contemporary professional philosophy, by aiming for some sort of axiom-system that is related to a well established precise discipline like set theory. Maybe. |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories are usually not assumed to be ordered by containment, but also be generality. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: I much prefer generality, which is responsive to the full picture, whereas containment seems to appeal too much to the orderly and formalised mind. Containments overlap, so we can't dream of a perfectly neat system. |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It is usually assumed of ontological categories that they can explain why certain substitutions make a statement false ('prime' for 'odd'), while others make it meaningless ('sweet' for 'odd', of numbers). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §05) | |
A reaction: So there is a strong link between big ontological questions, and Ryle's famous identification of the 'category mistake'. The phenomenon of the category mistake is undeniable, and should make us sympathetic to the idea of categories. |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Systems of ontological categories are systematizations of our intuitions about generality, intersubstitutability, and identity. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §23) | |
A reaction: I think we might be able to concede this without conceding the relativism about categories which Westerhoff espouses. I would claim that our 'intuitions' are pretty accurate about the joints of nature, and hence accurate about these criteria. |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories in terms of generality, dependence and containment are unsatisfactory because of the 'cut-off point problem': they don't give an account of how far down the order we can go and be sure we are still dealing with categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: I don't see why this should be a devastating objection to any theory. I have a very clear notion of a human being, but a very hazy notion of how far back towards its conception a human being extends. |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It seems to be one of the central points of constructing systems of ontological categories that everything can be placed in some category or other. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §49) | |
A reaction: After initial resistance to this, I suppose I have to give in. The phoenix (a unique mythological bird) is called a 'phoenix', though it might just be called 'John' (cf. God). If there were another phoenix, we would know how to categorise it. |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Surveyed ontological systems show overlaps: properties and relations turn up in every system; individuals form part of five systems; abstracta, collections/sets and events are in four; facts are in two. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: Westerhoff is a hero for doing such a useful survey. Of course, Quine challenges properties, and relations are commonly given a reductive analysis. Individuals can be challenged, and abstracta reduced. Sets are fictions. Events or facts? Etc. |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: I deny the absolutism of a unique system of ontological categories and the essentialist view of membership in ontological categories as necessary features. ...I regard ontological categories as similar to axioms of formalized theories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that modern axioms are not fundamental self-evident truths, but an economic set of basic statements from which some system can be derived. There may be no unique set of axioms for a formal system. |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that categories are relativistic, used for systematization, and that it is not an intrinsic feature of an object to belong to a category, and that there is no fundamental distinction between individuals and properties. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He calls his second conclusion 'anti-essentialist', but I think we can still get an account of (explanatory) essence while agreeing with his relativised view of categories. Wiggins might be his main opponent. |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: What ontological category a thing belongs to is not dependent on its inner nature, but dependent on what other things there are in the world, and this is a contingent matter. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §89) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at those, like Wiggins, who claim that category is essential to a thing, and there is no possible world in which that things could belong to another category. Sounds good, till you try to come up with examples. |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Essential kinds can be very specific, and arguably too specific for the purposes of ontological categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: Interesting. There doesn't seem to be any precise guideline as to how specific an essential kind might be. In scientific essentialism, each of the isotopes of tin has a distinct essence, but why should they not be categories |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
21181 | Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: General Relativity and quantum mechanics are the two great theories in physics today but they give two very different ideas for how forces work. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: Relativity says it is space curvature, and quantum theory says it is particle exchange? But is there a Relativity account of the strong nuclear force? |
21183 | Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The Laws of Thermodynamics introduced the concepts of entropy and work; put simply, how much useful energy you can really get out of a steam engine. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
A reaction: The point of science by this stage was to introduce measurable and quantifiable concepts |
21191 | Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The photon is actually a mix of two deeper things, the B and the W°, tied together by the Higgs mechanism. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
A reaction: The B (for 'Boson') transmits a force associated with the 'winding symmetry'. (I record this without properly understanding it.) |
21199 | Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The muon, like all fermions, spins - and because a spinning electric charge generates a magnetic field all fermions act like tiny bar magnets. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 11) |
21180 | Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: As far as we can tell, electrons (and quarks) are fundamental. They are not small lumps of material, because we could always ask what the material is. The electron just ...is. They are collections of properties, with no apparent size. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: This idea from physics HAS to be of interest to philosophers! The bundle theory is discredited for normal objects and for minds, and so is the substrate idea for supporting properties. But rigorous physics accepts a bundle theory. |
21189 | Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Quarks, leptons or bosons may actually be made up of something even smaller, bound together by a conjectural new force. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: Electrons are a type of lepton. Compare Idea 21180, from the same book. If electrons are not fundamental, what matters is not some 'stuff' they are made of, but a different force that would bind the ingredients. |
21184 | Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Explaining the stable electron orbits would require a complete rewriting of the physics of subatomic particles. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
A reaction: This really looks like a simple and major landmark moment. You can ignore a single anomaly, but not a central feature of your entire theory. |
21182 | Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics is the only working description of the universe that we have. It is amazingly precise, and so far every experimental test has verified its predictions. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: I take it from this that quantum mechanics is simply TRUE. Get over it! It will never turn out to be wrong, but may be subsumed within some more fine-grained or extensive theory. |
21187 | Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: We can never measure these virtual (transitory) particles directly, and it turns out that they don't even have to obey the laws of physics. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: These seems to be the real significance of the Uncertainty Principle. Such particles 'borrow' huge amounts of energy for very short times. |
21185 | Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Colour charge is 'three-dimensional'. As well as the charge having a positive or negative sign, it can also have a direction, and for convenience these three different directions (pointing like a weather vane) are labelled 'red', 'green' and 'blue'. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
21194 | The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Gravity is not included in the Standard Model because we simply cannot study it using particles. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that Einstein describes how gravity behaves, but not what it is. |
21195 | In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Supersymmetry suggest that the Standard Model becomes much simpler at high energies. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) |
21197 | Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The forces in the Standard Model are built on gauge symmetries, with a one-dimensional charge (like electromagnetism), a two-dimensional charge (the weak force), and a three dimensional charge (the strong force). | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 21185. |
21188 | Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: For the weak force there must be a corresponding 'weak charge', and all the fermions, all the quarks and leptons carry it. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: So electrons carry a weak charge, as well as an electromagnetic charge. Like owning several passports. |
21186 | Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Inside a proton the quarks are rushing around like caged animals, free to move until they push against the bars to try to escape, when the gluons pull them back in. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
21192 | Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, which means they barely interact at all, but because the weak force is crucial in the decays of so many other particles, neutrinos are still produced in huge numbers. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 08) | |
A reaction: They only interact with the W and Z bosons. |
21196 | To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: If all the forces are to combine, at some point they must all be the same strength, and Supersymmetry (SuSy) makes this happen. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an impressive reason for favouring supersymmetry - as long as you have an a priori preference for everything combining. |
21190 | 'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: 'Space' in physics really just means location. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
A reaction: Location can, of course, only be specified relative to something else. Space is really an abstraction, but at least it means there is some sort of background to locate all the fundamental fields. |
21193 | The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The most precise surveys of the stars and galaxies tell us that the universe is made up of 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, and just 5% regular matter (the stuff of the Standard Model of particle physics). | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
A reaction: Regular matter - that's me, that is. |
21198 | If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: If a theory has to rely on excessive 'fine-tuning', a series of extremely unlikely events in order to produce the universe we see around us, then it is extremely unlikely that this theory is correct. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: He says the Standard Model has 26 parameters which are only known by experiment, rather than by theory. So instead of saying '...so there is a God', we should say '...so our theory isn't very good'. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |