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20082
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Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
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Full Idea:
Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
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From:
report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
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A reaction:
[compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?
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19376
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A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Any machine ...is best defined in terms of its final cause, so that in the description of the parts it is therefore apparent in what way each of them is coordinated with the others for the intended us.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Human Body is a sort of Machine [1683], p.290), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 3 'Machines'
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A reaction:
We would use the 'function', an inherently teleological concept, and a concept which is almost indispensable for giving an illuminating description of the world. If nature is dispositional, it points towards things. Leibniz views persons as machines.
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