8 ideas
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
Full Idea: The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'. | |
From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7 | |
A reaction: This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour. |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
Full Idea: Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth. | |
From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate. |
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties? |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |