11 ideas
| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II) | |
| A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it. |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I) | |
| A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence? |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
| A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up. |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
| A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
| 23061 | Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray] |
| Full Idea: A free-thinking atheism would begin by questioning the prevailing faith in humanity. But there is little prospect of contemporary atheists giving up their reverence for this phantom. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Conc) | |
| A reaction: He seems to be referring to 'humanism', which I take to be quite different from atheism. I take it as obvious that simple atheism is entirely neutral on the question of whether we should have 'faith' in humanity (which presumably mean optimism). |
| 23057 | Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray] |
| Full Idea: Gnostic traditions envisage a supreme God that created the universe and then withdrew into itself, leaving the world to be ruled by a lesser god, or Demiurge, which might be indifferent or hostile to mankind. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It doesn't seem to solve any problems, given that the first God is 'supreme', and is therefore responsible for the introduction and actions of the later Demiurge. |
| 23056 | Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray] |
| Full Idea: It was only sometime around the sixth century BC, during the period when the Israelites returned to Jerusalem, that the idea that there is only one God emerged in Jewish religion. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a parallel move among the Greeks to elevate Zeus to special status. |
| 23055 | Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray] |
| Full Idea: The notion that religions are creeds - lists of propositions or doctrines that everyone must accept or reject - emerged only with Christianity. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: With a creed comes the possibility of heresy. I''m not happy with children being taught to recite something which begins 'I believe…', but which they have never thought about and barely understand. |
| 23058 | Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray] |
| Full Idea: Buddhism says nothing of any divine mind and rejects any idea of the soul. The world consists of processes and events. The human sense of self is an illusion; freedom is found in ridding oneself of this illusion. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why shaking off the illusion of a self is a superior state. Freedom to do what? Presumably nothing at all, since there is no self to desire anything. |