56 ideas
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Appeal to intuitions cannot prove or disprove anything. They merely create receptivity to particular interpretations of particular cases. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 04.3) | |
A reaction: A nice point, but more is needed. A gun to the head can create receptivity. What distinguishes good from bad intuitions? Why are intuitions different from mere whims or hopes? |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The liberal view is that people can be held responsible only for actions that are in their control: actions that reflect the agents' unforced choices, evaluations, and understanding of their significance - that is, autonomous actions. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Kekes, who is a somewhat right wing anti-liberal, thinks people should be mainly held responsible for the consequences, unless they have a very good excuse. |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The ascription of collective responsibility is inconsistent with …the belief that people should be held responsible for only their own autonomous actions. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The autonomy would need to be displaced, from the decision to act to the decision of identify with the organisation. But if you invest in an evil group you are responsible for actions you never even knew occurred (never mind autonomy). |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Moral and causal responsibility cannot be distinguished as clearly as the liberal strategy requires. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: I take assessment to be a two-stage operation. It is usually easy to assign causal responsibility. Moral responsibiity is quite different. Our negligence can make us morally responsible for an event we didn’t cause. |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If one main task of morality is to prevent evil, then morality must be concerned with all evil-producing actions, not just autonomous ones. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Is placing a railing next to a flight of steps a moral action? Possibly. |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If much evil is due to nonautonomous actions, then liberals cannot be right in idenitfying the domain of moral responsibility with the domain of autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.1) | |
A reaction: One might evade this anti-liberal thought by making responsibility directly proportional to degree of autonomy. Then the only counterexample would be genuine immorality that is entirely non-autonomous, but is there such a thing? |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Psychological states are relevant to the degree of an agent's moral responsibility, while the effects of their actions are relevant to whether the agents are liable to moral responsibility. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5) | |
A reaction: He has previously offered a problem case for this, where someone's social role makes them fully responsible whatever their mental state. I still think his distinction is helpful. 1) Whose fault is it, then 2) How far are they to blame? Normal practice. |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Agents who perform evil nonautonomously do not know what they are doing, because they have made a mistake in understanding or evaluating their own conduct. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.4) | |
A reaction: So while liberals say that true evil must be autonomous, Kekes says it may result from factual or evaluative error, for which people are also responsible. |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Ought implies can translates into the claim that only autonomous agents are morally responsible. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Since Kekes identifies autonomy as the key to liberalism, he sees this also as a basic liberal claim (which he rejects). I ought to ring my mother, but my phone is broken (so I ought not to ring my mother?).. |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why should moral responsibility be made to depend on autonomy, rather than on intelligence, education, social role, experience, or whatever? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Social role seems a particularly good one to cite. 'I didn't really understand what I was doing.' 'But it's your job to understand!' |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The view of human nature at the core of the liberal faith is that human beings are by their nature free, equal, rational, and morally good. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: These four claims are quite distinct, and should be evaluated separately. I think I'm something of a liberal, but I don't really accept any of them. Hm. I just want all people to have these attributes. |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Love is personal and partial. It is not love if it does not discriminate in favor of its object. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with that, mainly on the grounds that this is the natural form of human love. Generalised love of mankind seems like a distortion, even if it is well-meaning. |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Love is sentimental if it exaggerates the virtues and minimises the vices of its object. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.5) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this. It implies that we should retain a streak of cold evaluative objectivity, even about the people we love most. There is difference between knowing a person's qualities, and the importance we attach to those qualities. Forgive vices! |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
Full Idea: There is no more reason to think of evil as deviation from the good than there is to think of the good as deviation from evil. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.2) | |
A reaction: This is a political moderate right winger defending the concept of evil as a basic and inescapable component of existence, in contrast to liberals who tend to deny 'pure evil'. |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
Full Idea: What is crucial to morality are the good and evil effects of human actions, not their psychological causes. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.4) | |
A reaction: The context is his attack on the liberal idea that morality only concerns the actions of autonomous agents. Kekes says he is not a full consequentialist. He just urges that consequences be given greater weight. Even Kant must care about that. |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals deny the reflexivity of evil, …to prevent the evil consequences of an agent's morally deplorable actions from redounding to their detriment. Evil actions are allowed to reflect on their agents only if the agents cause them autonomously. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5) | |
A reaction: A central question of morality is essentialising character. That is, when does an eater of carrots become a carrot-eater? When does a performer of wicked deeds become a wicked person? Never, say many liberals. Wrong, says Kekes. |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is a mistaken assumption that knowledge of the sufferings of others creates an obligation to help them. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: A nice question is when that knowledge does become an obligation. The obvious criteria are proximity to the suffering, and capacity to relieve it. But then a wealthy person couldn't walk down the street without such obigations. Hm. |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If the darker aspects of human motivation did not exist, there would be no need for Rawls to place his people behind the veil of ignorance. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 07.2) | |
A reaction: All the critics observe that Rawls's blind choosers are nothing like as simple as the mere specks of rationality he seems to imagine. The usual objection is that they are already liberals, but this objection says they are already benevolent. |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The chief function of the state is seen to be to maintain what is referred to as the dialogue or conversation among the contending visions of how life should be lived. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This is Kekes's defence of 'pluralism'. It is not liberal, because liberal freedom, autonomy and equality is only one of the competing visions of the good life. Almost every state suppresses some such visions. |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is much easier to be a good citizen than it is to be a good parent. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. It is shocking how many people are bad citizens, given the limited demands. I think philosophers have some responsibility for beliefs and values which people bring to their citizenship. Parents need communal support. |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Universal adult suffrage and representative government are intended to give everyone equal initial political power, and assure that delegation is the only legitimate means to acquiring greater power. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.1) | |
A reaction: The delegation bit is where it all goes wrong. Once you've packed your representative off to the capital, you lose nearly all control over what sort of delegation happens next. It is hard to trust representatives voters have barely met. |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If social institutions were to have a first virtue, …prosperity would be a much stronger candidate that justice. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Kekes occasionally pays lip service to ecological issues, but this shows he is not serious. Endless economic growth will kill our planet, so it should never be our prime virtue. Also the impplication that you can't be too prosperous is plainly false. |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The basic liberal values are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice. What makes them basically valuable is that they enable individuals to live autonomously. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Kekes identifies respect for autonomy as the single value which unites all liberal doctrines (and he traces it back to Kant). |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals regard pluralism, freedom, rights, equality and distributive justice as basic …but this particular group of values is explained by the true core of liberalism, the inner citadel for whose protection all the liberal battles are waged: autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Given that children, soldiers, monks and nuns, and people in old folks homes have very limited autonomy, it is reasonable to query whether it really is so important. I like autonomy if I have external power over my life; not so good when in hospital. |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is important [for liberals] to realise that agents have no control over their possession of the capacities and opportunities on which their autonomy depends. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: It can be replied to Kekes that they also have little control over the capacities upon which his prized 'desert' depends. It may be an axiom of all modern political thought that people have less control than we imagine. |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
Full Idea: All liberals are egalitarians, though they may be more or less so. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.1) | |
A reaction: In the broadest view, this may be the one thing which distinguishes generalised liberals from the rest. To reject it needs a basis for the rejection, and every basis for its flat rejection is anathema to liberals. |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarian liberalism is criticised by classical [freedom] liberals for its coercive redistribution, by socialist liberals for not being egalitarian enough, and by conservative liberals for abandoning moral standards in the guise of neutrality. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.4) | |
A reaction: Income tax is 'coercive' distribution, but it is done with general consent in most liberal democracies. An interesting line between the needs of the state and the needs of its most needy citizens. |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The liberal conception of justice …excludes the essence of justice: desert. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], Pref) | |
A reaction: Certainly our normal concept of justice includes such thoughts as 'serves him right'. The trouble with the Kekes view is his society is continually morally judging people, and most people's grounds for that are fairly irrational. It's why we have courts. |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why are prosperity, order, civility, peace, a healthy environment, security, happiness, and law-abidingness not as important as those thought of by liberals as basic? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: This presumes that liberals only see a narrow core of values as basic to the structure of the society. Presumably every society should be well disposed towards the nice features listed here. Would their absence wreck the society? |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals comfortably believe that autonomy minimises contingency, that humans are disposed to the good, that wickedness is due to remediable institutions, and that humans are morally equal because of their autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 07.4) | |
A reaction: In a nutshell, Kekes thinks liberals are naďve. That institutions cause evil sounds more Marxist than liberal. When individuals become evil, it is reasonable for us to think that this need not have been the case. |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberal distribution cares more about the rights of the recipients than the rights of the donors. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Even if you are very left wing indeed, this is an important point. A society dominated by a powerful Robin Hood (steal from the rich, for the poor) is quite likely to end in civil war. But should society allow huge individual wealths to accumulate? |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Redistribution ought to aim to equalise the life expectancy of men and women, by making men have longer and women shorter lives. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.4) | |
A reaction: This is a nice satirical counterexample to the Rawlsian claim that 'undeserved inequalities should somehow be compensated for' [Rawls 1971: 100]. See also Kurt Vonnegut's story 'Harrison Bergeron'. |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is an obviolus fact that some people are morally better than others and that some are morally worse. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This could be conceded, without then asserting that the moral ones are superior, or more deserving. That is a social strategy, rather than a fact. We can challenge the criteria for 'morally better', but we can't deny a rankng once it is agreed. |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is certainly not intuitively deplorable that billionaires have more money than millionaires. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.3) | |
A reaction: Nice point. His claim is that sufficiency is the important feature, and equality is largely irrelevant. The reality, though, is that the billionaires, unlike the millionaires, could solve the insufficiency problem. |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If everyone has sufficient resources, it is not objectionable that some have more than others. What is objectionable is that some do not have enough. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Reasonable, but there seems to be sharp disagreement between the haves and the have-nots over what counts as 'enough'. In an affluent country, does enough include a car, restaurant dining, and foreign holidays? Or just food and shelter? |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Justice is a combination of consistency and desert. Like cases should be treated alike, and likenesses should be evaluated according to desert. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 06.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He needs to add that at least the desert should be relevant to the events being assessed. Should people not get a fair trial if they are branded as generally 'undeserving'? Hence the case must be judged before the desert is identified. |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
Full Idea: In welfare legislation, liberals concentrate on what people need rather than on what they deserve. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01,2) | |
A reaction: He makes assessing what people 'deserve' sound easy. Do drowning people deserve to be rescued? Do billionaires deserve their wealth (which is not the same as 'did they acquire it legally')? What do rude people deserve? |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A moral tradition need not be committed to monogamy, but it must regulate sexual conduct to prevent inbreeding, protect the sexually immature, prohibit some forms of coercion, and assign responsibility for raising children. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Wise words, I would say. The sexual liberation which arose with the contraceptive pill rather swamped thoughts of this type. These are just sensible responses to the facts of life. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |