10 ideas
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169. |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262). |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other. |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition. |
20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation. |
20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142) | |
A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential. |
20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up. |
20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139) | |
A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |