Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causation and Laws of Nature' and 'Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3)
     A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1)
     A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46)
     A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2)
     A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1)
     A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17)
     A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3)
     A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: If we account for the stability of a piece of brass by reference to the substantial form of brass, then it is mysterious how it can be melted and yet remain brass.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 02.3)
     A reaction: [Alexander is discussing Boyle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: The peripatetic philosophers, in spite of their disagreements, all treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter and not to be understood in material terms.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 54)
     A reaction: This is the simple reason why hylomorphism became totally discredited, in the face of the 'mechanical philosophy'. But there must be a physical version of hylomorphism, and I don't think Aristotle himself would reject it.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22)
     A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: Is there any way of separating the qualities that bodies appear to have into two groups, one as small as possible and the other as large as possible, such that the smaller group can plausibly be used to explain the larger?
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 5.02)
     A reaction: Alexander implies that this is a question Locke asked himself. This is pretty close to what I take to be the main question for essentialism, though I am cautious about couching it in terms of groups of qualities. I think this was Aristotle's question.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: The idea of a designed universe has not been utterly irrelevant to the scientific project; it is one of the beliefs that can give a scientist the faith that there are laws, waiting to be discovered, that govern all phenomena.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 03.3)
     A reaction: Of course if you start out looking for the 'laws of God' that is probably what you will discover. Natural selection strikes me as significant, because it shows no sign of being a procedure appropriate to a benevolent god.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: The alchemists sought the separation of the 'pure essences' of substances from unwanted impurities. This last goal was of great importance for the development of modern chemistry at the hands of Boyle and his successors.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 01.1)
     A reaction: In a nutshell this gives us the reason why essences are so important, and also why they became discredited. Time for a clear modern rethink.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: There are two conceptions of absolute space. In the first, empty space is independent of objects but provides a frame of reference so an object has a location. ..In the second space exists independently, but has no 'marks' into which objects can be put.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 6)
     A reaction: He says that Locke seems to reject the first one, but accept the second one.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.