11 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens. |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way. |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46) | |
A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood. |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2) | |
A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of? |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts. |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17) | |
A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me. |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars. |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea. |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135) | |
A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |