18 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
Full Idea: I do not know any better way of showing what there is than looking at the assumptions needed to make sense of our normal talk. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: Davidson was a pupil of Quine. This I take to be the last flowering of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. The ontology we deduce from talk in a children's playground might be very bizarre, but we are unlikely to endorse it. 'Honest, it's true!' |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous. |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Explanations typically relate statements, not events. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: An oddly linguistic way of putting our attempts to understand the world. Presumably the statements are supposed to be about the events (or whatever), and they are supposed to be true, so we are trying to relate features of the world. |
7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15) | |
A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity. |
7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6) | |
A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem. |
23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26) | |
A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist. |
7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39) | |
A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly. |
7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33) | |
A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food. |
7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34) | |
A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines. |
7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2 | |
A reaction: I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view. |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'. | |
From: comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1 | |
A reaction: Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine). |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3) | |
A reaction: If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer? |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: For Davidson, what makes singular causal statements true is the existence of some regularities or laws. All causal is nomological: c causes e iff there is a law that connects events like c with events like e. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
A reaction: I wonder if the cart is before the horse here. Scriven says this is just a claim that there are "phantom laws". It is the Humean view of causation, but surely the laws come after the causation, so can't be used to explain it? |
7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13) | |
A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this. |