Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Emperor's New 'Knows'' and 'Letters to Russell'

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8 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege]
     Full Idea: You need a double transition, from cardinal numbes (Anzahlen) to the rational numbers, and from the latter to the real numbers generally. I wish to go straight from the cardinal numbers to the real numbers as ratios of quantities.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1903.05.21), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's'
     A reaction: Note that Frege's real numbers are not quantities, but ratios of quantities. In this way the same real number can refer to lengths, masses, intensities etc.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege]
     Full Idea: With the loss of my Rule V, not only the foundations of arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.06.22)
     A reaction: Obviously he was stressed, but did he really mean that there could be no foundation for arithmetic, suggesting that the subject might vanish into thin air?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
     Full Idea: How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there?
     From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
     Full Idea: How can it be that a sentence like 'George knows that he has hands', even with time and references fixed, does not have a fixed propositional content?
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], I)
     A reaction: The appeal is to G.E. Moore's common sense view of immediate knowledge (Idea 6349). The reply is simply that the word 'knows' shifts its meaning, having high standards in sceptical philosophy classes, and low standards on the street.
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
     Full Idea: Contextualism seems to predict that if you encounter a knowledge attribution out of context you won't be in a position to grasp which proposition the sentence expresses.
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], I)
     A reaction: It is only the word 'knows' which is at issue in the sentence. If someone is said to 'know' about the world of the fairies, we might well be puzzled as to what proposition was being expressed. Is the word 'flat' baffling out of context?
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
     Full Idea: When a sceptic brings up far-fetched possibilities and argues that we can't rule them out, he is not raising the standard for the word 'know'. He is showing it is tougher than we realise for a belief to qualify as normal knowledge at all.
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], III)
     A reaction: [Bach cites Richard Feldman for this idea] I think that what happens in the contextual account is that 'true', 'belief' and 'know' retain their standard meaning, and it is 'justified' which shifts. 'I am fully justified' can have VERY different meanings!
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.