10 ideas
6855 | Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M] |
Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments. | |
From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134) | |
A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world. |
6856 | Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M] |
Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made. | |
From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136) | |
A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions. |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What makes the metaphysical realist a 'metaphysical' realist is his belief that there is somewhere 'one true theory' (two theories which are true and complete descriptions of the world would be mere notational variants of each other). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation') | |
A reaction: This is wrong!!!!! Commitment to one reality doesn't imply that only one comprehensive theory is possible. Theory-making (at least in any human language, or in mathematics) is an inherently limited activity. |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The idea of a coherent theory of the noumena; consistent, systematic, and arrived at by 'the scientific method' seems to me to be chimerical. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Failure') | |
A reaction: I sort of agree with this, but it definitely doesn't make me an anti-realist. |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Relative to the description 'that statue', a certain shape is an essential property of the object; relative to the description 'that piece of clay', the shape not an essential property (but being clay is). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Relative to the description 'that loathsome object', is the statue essentially loathsome? Asserting the essence of an object is a response to the object, not a response to a description of it. This is not the solution to the statue problem. |
6857 | An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M] |
Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be. | |
From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140) | |
A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously. |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Moore and Russell held the strange view that 'sensibilia' (sense data) are mind-independent entities: a view so dotty, on the face of it, that few analytic philosophers like to be reminded that this is how analytic philosophy started. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: I suspect the view was influenced by the anti-psychologism of Frege, and his idea that all the other concepts are mind-independent, living by their own rules in a 'third realm'. Personally I think analytic philosophy needs more psychology, not less. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Imagine a Venusian lands on Earth and observes a forest fire, and says 'I know what caused that - the atmosphere is saturated with oxygen!'. Thus one man's 'background condition' can easily be another man's 'cause'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation') | |
A reaction: You can't sweep 'the' cause of a fire away so easily. There is always oxygen on Earth, but only occasional forest fires. The oxygen doesn't 'trigger' the fire (i.e. it isn't the proximate cause). |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |