16 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word. |
23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: A mental state cannot count as a belief unless it has a reasonable life expectancy. It must be the sort of thing that one is disposed to assert not only now but in the future too. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There are obvious counterexamples, where a firm belief is strongly formed, only to be dashed by a counterexample (such as a new witness in court) soon afterwards. That said, this idea is obviously correct. |
23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: Accuracy and Sincerity sustain trust as regards contributing knowledge to the pool; Testimonial Justice helps sustain trust as regards acquiring knowledge from the pool. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Fricker's contribution is to show that acquiring knowledge has its own virtues, alongside discovering and communicating it. I take the underlying virtue to be absolute respect for all possible contributors. |
23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: Moral/testimonial judgement is non-inferential, uncodifiable, intrinsically motivating, intrinsically reason-giving, and typically has an emotional aspect. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Fricker's compressed summary of her findings about testimony. The first words indicate her belief that assessment of testimony is a moral affair. |
23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: In Tyler Burge's view we have an a priori entitlement for believing what others tell us, other things being equal. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 1.3 n11) | |
A reaction: [Burge 'Content Preservation' 1992] Close to Davidson's Charity (that without a default assumption of truth-speaking language won't work at all). Davidson is right about casual conversation, but for important testimony Burge should be more cautious. |
23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: A person should receive the word of his interlocutor in the light of the probability that someone like that would (be able and willing to) to tell someone like him the truth about something like this in circumstances like these. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.2) | |
A reaction: That's a pretty good summary of the rational response to testimony. I can't think of any other factors. |
23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: For a hearer to identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgements they must be alert to the impact not only of the speaker's social identity, but also the impact of the own social identity on their credibility judgements. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [why are all sentences in academic writing twice as long as they need to be? - that question is deeper than it looks!] This is a salutary warning. Not just 'what are my prejudices?', but also 'what is this person willing to tell a person like me?'. |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days. |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach. |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V) |
23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: Our idea of testimonial sensibility is a spontaneous critical sensitivity permanently in training and adapting to experience. …This gives us a picture of how judgements can be rational yet unreflective, critical yet non-inferential. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: Love this. I want to connect human reasoning to good judgement by animals, and I offer the word 'sensible' to bridge the gap. Dogs and scientists can be sensible. Fricker spells out more fully what I have in mind, with reference to testimony. |
23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: I think that identifying forms of moral resentment that fall short of blame but which are agent-directed is the key to achieving appropriate moral response across historical and cultural distance. | |
From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Very good. Simple blame for horrible actions performed in remote rather horrible societies is pointless. But switching off moral sensibilities when reading history and anthropology looks like a slippery slope, so 'moral resentment' is nice. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |