19 ideas
19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan). |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.64) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in tune with Quine's assertion that logic is potentially revisable, and the idea is pragmatist in spirit. It is hard to deny that intuitions about what makes a good argument control our logic. I say the world controls our intuitions. |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Dispositions of a thing are as important to us as overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. So we are moved to enquire whether we can bring them down to earth, and explain disposition terms without reference to occult powers. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], II.3) | |
A reaction: Mumford quotes this at the start of his book on dispositions, as his agenda. I suspect that the 'occult' aspect crept in because dispositions were based on powers, and the dominant view was that these were the immediate work of God. |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
Full Idea: Goodman constructed arguments that purported to show that a satisfactory syntactic analysis of the confirmation relation can never be found. In response, philosophers of science tried to model it in probabilistic terms. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 4 | |
A reaction: I take this idea to say that Bayesianism was developed in response to the grue problem. This is an interesting light on 'grue', which never bothered me much. The point is it scuppered formal attempts to model induction. |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Goodman has shown that no purely formal criterion can distinguish arguments that are intuitively sound inductive arguments for unsound ones: for every sound one there is an unsound one of the same form. The predicates in the argument make the difference. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Hilary Putnam - Why there isn't a ready-made world 'Causation' | |
A reaction: This is to swallow grue whole. I think a bit more chewing is called for. By this date Putnam strikes me as a crazy relativist who has lost his grip on the world. Note the word 'formal' - but Putnam seems to think the argument is important. |
398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08) | |
A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life. |
394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33) |
396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26) |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve. |
17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1 | |
A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms. |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Rather than a sentence being used for prediction because it is a law, it is called a law because it is used for prediction. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.21), quoted by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §5.4 | |
A reaction: This smacks of dodgy pragmatism, and sounds deeply wrong. The perception of a law has to be prior to making the prediction. Why do we make the prediction, if we haven't spotted a law. Goodman is mesmerised by language instead of reality. |
399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move? | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12) |
20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus. |
402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29) |
403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30) |
1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12) |
395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26) |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |