16 ideas
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
Full Idea: How are we to determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: Nice question. If I say 'philosophy is the love of wisdom' and 'philosophy bores me', why should one be part of its definition and the other not? What if I stipulated that the second one is part of my definition, and the first one isn't? |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
Full Idea: It is one thing to believe something a priori and another for this belief to be epistemically justified. The latter is required for a priori knowledge. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
A reaction: Personally I would agree with this, because I don't think anything should count as knowledge if it doesn't have supporting reasons, but fans of a priori knowledge presumably think that certain basic facts are just known. They are a priori justified. |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Understanding is itself based on a priori commitment. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: This sounds plausible, but needs more justification than Horwich offers. This is the sort of New Rationalist idea I associate with Bonjour. The crucial feature of the New lot is, I take it, their fallibilism. All understanding is provisional. |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Our a priori commitment to certain sentences is not really explained by our knowledge of a word's meaning. It is the other way around. We accept a priori that the sentences are true, and thereby provide it with meaning. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a lovely trump card, but how on earth do you decide that a sentence is true if you don't know what it means? Personally I would take it that we are committed to the truth of a proposition, before we have a sentence for it. |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
Full Idea: A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge. |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
Full Idea: If we stipulate the meaning of 'the number of x's' so that it makes Hume's Principle true, we must accept Hume's Principle. But a precondition for this stipulation is that Hume's Principle be accepted a priori. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §9) | |
A reaction: Yet another modern Quinean argument that all attempts at defining things are circular. I am beginning to think that the only a priori knowledge we have is of when a group of ideas is coherent. Calling it 'intuition' might be more accurate. |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
Full Idea: One potential source of a priori knowledge is the innate structure of our minds. We might, for example, have an a priori commitment to classical logic. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §11) | |
A reaction: Horwich points out that to be knowledge it must also say that we ought to believe it. I'm wondering whether if we divided the whole territory of the a priori up into intuitions and then coherent justifications, the whole problem would go away. |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |