10 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set? | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1') | |
A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious? |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In being willing to countenance archipelagos, one embraces scattered objects. Why not then embrace the 'archipelago' of my car and the Eiffel Tower? | |
From: John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and striking point. Language is full of embracing terms like 'the furniture', but that doesn't mean we assume the furniture is unified. The archipelago is less of an 'object' if you live on one of the islands. |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Self-proclaimed four-dimensionalists typically adopt a picture that reckons instantaneous objects (and facts about them) to be more fundamental than long-lived ones. | |
From: John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A nice elucidation. As in Idea 14588, this seems motivated by a desire for some sort of foundationalism or atomism. Why shouldn't a metaphysic treat the middle-sized or temporally extended as foundational, and derive the rest that way? |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: One person says 'He can't dig a hole; he hasn't got a spade', and another says 'He can dig a hole; just give him a spade', and both uses of the modal 'can' will be true. So some philosophers say that all modal predications are thus context-dependent. | |
From: John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Quine is the guru for this view of modality. Hawthorne's example seems to me to rely too much on the linguistic feature of contrasting 'can' and 'can't'. The underlying assertion in the propositions says something real about the possibilities. |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2') | |
A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification. |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified. | |
From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated. |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137) | |
A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Nowadays it is common for metaphysicians to hold both that space-time regions are less fundamental than the space-time points that compose them, and that facts about the regions are less fundamental than facts about the points and their arrangements. | |
From: John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite sure what a physicist would make of this. It seems to be motivated by some a priori preference for atomism, and for system-building from minimal foundations. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |