47 ideas
354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 069b) | |
A reaction: Aristotle also says that prudence (phronesis) makes virtue possible. |
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Do you think it possible to form an adequate conception of the nature of an individual soul without considering the nature of soul in general? | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 270c) | |
A reaction: Do animals understand anything (as opposed to simply being aware of things)? |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
Full Idea: When I believe that I have found in anyone the ability to discuss unity and plurality as they exist in the nature of things, I follow his footsteps as if he was a god. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 266b) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the problem of identity, which is at the heart of modern metaphysics. |
370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
Full Idea: Souls which have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy will live after death without bodies. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 114b) | |
A reaction: Purifying it of what? Error, or desire, or narrow-mindedness, or the physical? |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
Full Idea: A speaker must be able to define a subject generically, and then to divide it into its various specific kinds until he reaches the limits of divisibility. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 277b) |
350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: When philosophers investigate with the help of the body they are led astray, but through reflection the soul gets a clear view of the facts. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 065c) |
362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
Full Idea: No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than developing a dislike for argument. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 089d) |
13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
Full Idea: I cannot convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of the one to the other, ...or that when you divide one, the cause of becoming two is now the division. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: Lovely questions, all leading to the conclusion that two consists of partaking in duality, to which you can come by several different routes. |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
Full Idea: In our reasoning we need a clear view of the ability to divide a genus into species, observing the natural joints, not mangling any of the parts, like an unskilful butcher. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 265d) | |
A reaction: In modern times this Platonic idea has become the standard metaphor for realism. I endorse it. I think nature has joints, and we should hunt for them. There are natural sets. The joints may exist in abstract concepts, as well as in objects. |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I believe that someone is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable of encompassing many, I follow 'straight behind, in his footsteps, as if he were a god'. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 266b) | |
A reaction: [Plato quote Odyssey 2.406] This is the sort of simple but profound general observation which only the early philosophers bothered to make, and no one comments on now. Encompassing many under one is the very essence of thinking. |
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c) | |
A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men. |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
Full Idea: It takes a man to understand by the use of universals, and to collect out of the multiplicity of sense-impressions a unity arrived at by a process of reason. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 249b) |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
Full Idea: What overpowering love knowledge would inspire if it could bring a clear image of itself before our sight, and the same may be said of the other forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 250d) | |
A reaction: the motivation in Plato's theory |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a) |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c) | |
A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims. |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a) |
16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
Full Idea: The day before the trial the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands. - Which ship is that? - It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking the victims. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 058a) | |
A reaction: Not philosophical, but this is the Ship of Theseus whose subsequent identity, Plutarch tells us, became a matter of dispute. |
359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
Full Idea: If someone sees a resemblance, but feels that it falls far short of the original, they must therefore have a recollection of the original. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 074e) |
357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
Full Idea: The way in which people react to a geometrical diagram or anything like that is unmistakable proof of the theory of recollection. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 073a) |
9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: We are convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the original ideal which motivates the devotion to a priori knowledge - that it will lead to a 'pure' knowledge, which in Plato's case will be eternal and necessary knowledge, like taking lessons from the gods. Wrong. |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
Full Idea: True knowledge is concerned with the abode of true reality, without colour or shape, intangible but utterly real, apprehensible only to the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 247c) |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are some occasions when both prosecution and defence should positively suppress the facts in favour of probability, if the facts are improbable. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 272e) |
15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. Then it befitted a man to investigate only ...what is best. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: A reversal of the modern idea of 'best explanation'. Socrates is citing Anaxagoras's proposal to understand things by interpreting the workings of a supreme Mind. It is the religious version of best explanation. |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Self-motion is of the very nature of the soul. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245e) | |
A reaction: This culminates a length discussion of the soul. He gives an implausible argument that the soul is immortal, because it could never cease its self-motion. Why are we so unimpressed by motion, when the Greeks were amazed by it? |
13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097a) | |
A reaction: In retrospect it seems surprising that such clever people hadn't worked this one out, given the evidence of anatomy, in animals and people, and given brain injuries. By the time of Galen they appear to have got the answer. |
364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is one soul, even minutely, more or less of a soul than another? Not in the least. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 093b) | |
A reaction: This idea is attractive because unconsciousness and death seem to be abrupt procedures, and so appear to be all-or-nothing, but I would personally view extreme Alzheimer's as an erasing of the soul, though a minimum level of it seems all-or-nothing. |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: Plato had a conception of the emotions and our bodily appetites as being like wild horses, to be harnassed and controlled by reason. | |
From: report of Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE]) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Education' | |
A reaction: This seems to make Plato the patriarch of puritanism. See Symposium, as well as Phaedrus. But bringing up children can often seem like taming wild beasts. |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
Full Idea: Unless a man becomes an adequate philosopher he will never be an adequate speaker on any subject. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 261a) | |
A reaction: Depends. Hitler showed little sign of clear philosophical thinking, but the addition of lights and uniforms seemed to sweep reasonably intelligent people along with him. |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
Full Idea: The purpose of the 'Phaedrus' is to pioneer the notion of philosophical rhetoric. | |
From: comment on Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], Ch.10) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Plato's Republic and Greek Enlightenment | |
A reaction: This is a wonderfully challenging view of what Plato was up to. One might connect it with Rorty's claim that philosophy should move away from epistemology and analysis, towards hermeneutics, which sounds to me like rhetoric. 'Phaedrus' is beautiful. |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a speech is to be classed as excellent, does that not presuppose knowledge of the truth about the subject of the speech in the mind of the speaker. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 259e) | |
A reaction: I like the thought that Plato's main interest was rhetoric, but with the view that the only good rhetoric is truth-speaking. It would be hard to admire a speech if you disagreed with it. |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only beauty has the privilege of being the most clearly discerned and the most lovely of the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 250e) | |
A reaction: the motivation in Plato's theory |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
Full Idea: In each one of us there are two ruling and impelling principles: a desire for pleasure, which is innate, and an acquired conviction which causes us to aim at excellence. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 237d) | |
A reaction: This division is too neat and simple. An obsession with pleasure I would take to be acquired. If you set out to do something, I think there is an innate desire to do it well. |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
Full Idea: Life is not worth living for pleasures whose enjoyment entirely depends on previous sensation of pain, like almost all physical pleasures. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 258e) | |
A reaction: Eating exotic food which is hard to obtain? (Pay someone to obtain it). Rock climbing. Training for sport. |
361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality - which it is not. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 084c) | |
A reaction: Do people think that? Most people distinguish subjective from objective. Wounded soldiers are also aware of victory or defeat. |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
Full Idea: The conviction which impels us towards excellence is rational, and the power by which it masters us we call self-control. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 237e) |
351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
Full Idea: All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and we want this because of the body, to which we are slave. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is not ordained that bad men should be friends with one another. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 255b) |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing, and the condition without which it could not be a cause. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 099c) | |
A reaction: Not as simple as he thinks. It seems fairly easy to construct a case where the immediately impacting event remains constant, and the background condition is changed. Even worse when negligence is held to be the cause. |
369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor force to keep it from falling. The uniformity of heaven and equilibrium of earth are sufficient support. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 108e) |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245d) | |
A reaction: This is the essence of Aquinas's Third Way of proving God's existence. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
Full Idea: The mind of a god, sustained by pure intelligence and knowledge, is satisfied with the vision of reality, and nourished and made happy by the vision of truth. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 247d) |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
Full Idea: Because we have never seen or formed an adequate idea of a god, we picture him to ourselves as a being of the same kind as ourselves but immortal. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 246d) |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
Full Idea: There is not a single sound reason for positing the existence of such a being who is immortal | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 246d) |
363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: The theory that our soul exists even before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the soul's possession of the ultimate standard of reality. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 092d) |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |
Full Idea: All soul is immortal, for what is always in motion is immortal. Only that which moves itself never ceases to be in motion. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245c) |